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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE BLACK – WHITE WAGE GAP 
 
 
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the black – white wage gap narrowed 
significantly, but has remained constant since the late 1980s. The black – white wage gap 
in the recent period may reflect differences in human capital. A key component of human 
capital is labor market experience. The first chapter of this dissertation examines how 
differences in the returns and patterns of experience accumulation affect the black – 
white wage gap. Accounting for differences in the nature of experience accumulation 
does not explain the very large gap in wages between blacks and whites. Instead, the 
wage gap seems to be driven by constant differences between blacks and whites which 
may represent unobserved differences in skill or the effects of discrimination. The second 
chapter of the dissertation examines the role of discrimination in explaining the wage gap 
by asking whether statistical discrimination by employers causes the wages of never 
incarcerated blacks to suffer when the incarceration rate of blacks in an area increases. I 
find little evidence that black incarceration rates negatively affect the wages of never 
incarcerated blacks. Instead, macroeconomic effects in areas with higher incarceration 
rates play a more important role in explaining the variation in black wages. The third and 
final chapter of the dissertation examines the black – white wage gap and its determinants 
across the entire wage distribution to determine if the factors that are driving the wage 
gap vary across the distribution. I find that at the top of the conditional distribution, 
differences in the distribution of characteristics explain relatively more of the black – 
white wage gap than differences in the prices of characteristics. At the bottom of the 
conditional distribution, differences in the distribution of characteristics explain relatively 
more of the wage gap—although this finding varies across different specifications of the 
model. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
The difference in wages between blacks and whites has been extensively 
examined by labor economists. The black - white wage gap narrowed significantly during 
the 1960s and 1970s, but since then the differences in wages has remained relatively 
constant. The convergence in wages that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s has been 
attributed to improvements in the levels and quality of schools attended by blacks (Smith 
and Welch 1989; Card and Kruger 1992, 1996) as well as the enactment of anti-
discrimination legislation (Heckman and Payner 1989; Donohue and Heckman 1991). 
The slowdown in convergence during the 1980s and 1990s has been attributed to racial 
differences in the levels and returns to observed and unobserved skill (Bollinger 2003; 
Chay and Lee 2000; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1991; Neal and Johnson 1996). Years of 
schooling and years of labor market experience are often used as proxies for labor market 
skill.  
The first chapter of this dissertation examines in more detail how much 
differences in the returns to experience can account for differences in wages between 
blacks and whites. Specifically, I examine how differences in the returns and patterns of 
experience accumulation affect the black – white wage gap. In this chapter, I argue that 
black workers interrupt their careers frequently and work more intensively at different 
points in their careers than white workers. Not accounting for these factors will lead to 
biased estimates of wage growth and the black – white wage gap. However, even 
accounting for differences in the nature of experience accumulation, I am unable to 
account for the very large gap in wages between blacks and whites. Instead, the black – 
white wage gap seems to be driven by constant differences between blacks and whites. 
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These constant differences in wages received by blacks and whites may represent 
unobserved differences in skill or the effects of discrimination. Neal and Johnson (1996) 
have shown that differences in unobserved skill, as captured by differences in scores on 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, can explain 3/4 of the black – white wage gap. 
Alternatively, if blacks have lower reservations wages then this could explain the large 
constant differences between blacks and whites. One explanation for why blacks may 
have lower reservation wages than whites is that they receive lower wage offers because 
of discriminatory employers or face higher search costs. Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked 
(2000) present a search model with discriminatory employers in which employers search 
and make offers to predominately white networks. This lowers the reservation wage of 
blacks because, when they encounter discriminatory employers, they have reduced 
bargaining power.  
The second chapter of this dissertation takes a first step in examining the role of 
discrimination in explaining black – white wage differences by testing for statistical 
discrimination on the part of employers. Statistical discrimination occurs when employers 
form perceptions about a workers’ productivity based on the observable characteristics 
like age, race, gender, and education. In this second chapter, I hypothesize that employers 
statistically discriminate against blacks because they don’t like hiring ex-offenders who 
they believe will be less productive or less reliable. To avoid the possibility of hiring ex 
offenders, employers use formal and informal screens to separately identify ex-offenders 
from non offenders. Formal screens include criminal background checks while statistical 
discrimination by employers would represent an example of an informal screen. Informal 
screens involve making hiring decisions based on the race of the applicant. As the 
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incarceration rate of blacks in an area increases, employers are more likely to perceive 
lower skilled black male youths as more likely to have a criminal background. As a result 
of this perception, the wages and employment of lower skilled black male youths may 
suffer. The second chapter asks whether statistical discrimination by employers causes 
the wages of never incarcerated blacks to suffer when the incarceration rate of blacks in 
an area increases. Raphael (2004) illustrates that increases in the fraction of incarcerated 
blacks can explain up to half of the decline in black male employment relative to whites. 
In the second chapter, I test for the presence of statistical discrimination by examining 
whether the number of blacks in county jails affects the wages of never incarcerated 
blacks in a county. I assume that the number of blacks incarcerated in a county affects 
employer perceptions about the criminality of black applicants especially in the absence 
of more formal screens. I find little evidence that the fraction of blacks incarcerated in a 
county negatively affects the wages of never incarcerated blacks. An increase in the black 
incarceration rate in a county reduces wages by 13% for all black males and by roughly 
15% for black males with a high school degree or some college education. The results, 
however, are not robust to the inclusion of year effects which causes the coefficient on 
the black county incarceration rate to decline by half and lose statistical significance. 
Overall, the finding of a negative wage effect of the black county incarceration rate 
appears consistent with the idea of statistical discrimination. However, macroeconomic 
effects in areas with higher incarceration rates play a more important role. 
The third and final chapter of this dissertation examines the black – white wage 
gap and its determinants across the entire wage distribution to see if the factors that are 
driving the wage gap vary across the distribution. For example, differences in 
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characteristics between blacks and whites may explain relatively more of the black – 
white wage gap at the top of the conditional distribution than difference in the returns to 
characteristics. I find that in both the actual experience and work history models, 
differences in the distribution of characteristics and differences in the return to 
characteristics both contribute positively to the black - white gap. At the top of the 
conditional distribution, differences in the distribution of characteristics explain relatively 
more of the black – white wage gap than differences in the prices of characteristics. At 
the bottom of the conditional distribution, differences in the distribution of characteristics 
explain relatively more of the wage gap—although this finding varies across different 
specifications of the model. These results suggest that differences in the timing of 
experience and work interruptions that are captured in the work history model are 
important in explaining the black - white wage gap at lower parts of the distribution. In 
terms of how the overall wage gap evolves, I find that the adjusted wage gap increases 
from the bottom to the top of the conditional wage distribution, but the rate at which the 
gap grows is faster at the bottom of the conditional distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Nola Ogunro 2009  
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CHAPTER 2. Race, Experience and the Black – White Wage Gap  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s the black - white wage gap narrowed 
significantly but has since remained constant. A large body of work has emerged in 
Labor Economics that examines the reasons for the early convergence and recent 
stagnation of black -white relative wages. The wage convergence of the 1960s and 1970s 
has been attributed to improvements in the quality of schools attended by blacks (see 
Smith and Welch 1989; Card and Kruger 1992, 1996) and the enactment of anti-
discrimination legislation (see Heckman and Payner 1989; Donohue and Heckman 1991) 
The slowdown in convergence during the 1980s and 1990s has been attributed to racial 
differences in the levels and returns to observed and unobserved skill (see Bollinger 
2003; Chay and Lee 2000; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1991; Neal and Johnson 1996 ). 
Neal and Johnson (1996) demonstrate that black – white differences in pre-market skill as 
measured by AFQT scores account for 3/4 of the black - white wage gap while Bollinger 
(2003) shows that AFQT accounts for at least 3/4 of the black – white wage gap. Neal 
and Johnson focus on AFQT scores as an appropriate measure of skill because schooling 
levels are believed to be noisy proxies of actual skill. Using this improved measure of 
skill they find that discrimination explains less of the wage gap than previously thought. 
The literature on black - white wage inequality had concluded that discrimination 
contributed anywhere from one – third to one – half of the black - white wage gap (see 
Neal and Johnson 1996). Another key component of human capital is labor market 
experience. Numerous studies have shown that blacks receive lower returns to experience 
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than whites. This has implications for the observed black - white wage gap. If wages 
grow at a slower pace for blacks than whites then this could explain the differences in 
wages observed between blacks and whites during their careers as well as differences in 
labor force participation.  
This chapter examines how differences in the returns to experience between 
blacks and whites contribute to the black – white wage differential when an improved 
measure of experience is used. The improved measure of experience is able to capture 
more of the heterogeneity in individual experience than traditional measures. The results 
suggest that the differences in the return to experience between blacks and whites aren’t 
large and what really seems to be driving the wage gap are black – white differences in 
the intercepts of the wage equations. If differences in the intercepts represent differences 
in the levels and or returns to unobserved skill endowments, then the results suggest the 
reasons for the racial wage gap occur prior to labor market entry. Neal and Johnson find 
differences in unobserved pre-market skill measured by AFQT scores and show that these 
differences explain much of the black – white differences in wages. Conversely, the 
intercept may represent the effects of discrimination. Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked 
(2000) propose a search model with discriminatory employers in which employers search 
and make offers to predominately white networks. This means that when blacks run into 
a white employer they have lower reservation wages because of their reduced bargaining 
power.  
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2.2 Background 
2.2.1 The Black - white Wage Gap 
For the better part of the last 70 years, African-American males have seen large 
improvements in their economic well-being. In recent years these improvements have 
slowed down and even been reversed. In 1940, the average wage of black males was 43% 
of the average wage of white males and by 1980 the average wage of black males was 
73% of the average wage of white males (see Smith and Welch 1989). Altonji and Blank 
(1998) note that while the black - white wage gap narrowed during the 1960s and early 
1970s, it remained essentially constant during the 1980s and 1990s. Using data from the 
1996 Current Population Survey (CPS) they show that hourly wages of blacks were 2/3rd 
that of whites so that relative wages were essentially unchanged from the previous 
decade. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) observed a similar pattern of convergence 
followed by stagnation or divergence in black - white relative wages. Using data from the 
1964 to1988 Current Population Survey, they show the black - white wage gap fell from 
.45 in 1963 to .73 in 1979. By 1987, the wage gap was essentially unchanged at .73.  
Neal (2008) also documents the improvement and subsequent deterioration of the 
relative wages of blacks during the latter half of the 21st century. Neal shows that 
improvements occurred intermittently as blacks experienced gains in their wages relative 
to whites during the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s, but not during the 1950s, 1980s, and 
1990s. Using data from the 1940-2000 Decennial Censuses, Neal (2008) reports the 
average black/white wage ratio and the position of the average black in the earnings 
distribution of whites males aged 26-46 working 48 or more weeks during the previous 
calendar year. Similar to the findings of Smith and Welch (1989), Neal finds the ratio of 
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black – white wages equal to .45 in 1940, increasing to .65 in 1970, and equal to .73 in 
1980 before declining to .72 in 1990 and .70 in 2000. The average black male had 
earnings located in the 17th percentile of the white male earnings distribution in 1940. By 
1970 black male earnings were located in the 27th percentile of the white earnings 
distribution before reaching the 36th percentile in 1990 and 2000. In summary, Neal 
notes that blacks experienced relative improvements in their overall wages and their 
position in the white male earnings distribution during the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, 
the past 20 years have been characterized by a reduction in the black - white ratio of 
average earnings although blacks have continued to improve their position in the earnings 
distribution of whites.  
 Overall, the literature examining black - white wage differences documents rapid 
convergence in relative wages during the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s with a slowdown in 
convergence during the 1980s and 1990s. Some authors have questioned the rapid 
convergence observed during the 1970s. Chandra (2003) argues that failure to account for 
the selective withdrawal of black males from the labor force overstates the convergence 
in black - white wages. Since wages are only observed for workers and blacks non-
workers are disproportionately low skilled this means a non random group of black males 
chooses to withdrawal from the labor force. Chandra finds that correcting for these 
selection effects reverses the finding that wages converged rapidly during the 1970-1990 
period. Instead, his results show little or no change in convergence over this period and 
that from 1980 to 1990 wages actually diverged 3.5-6%. Selective labor force 
withdrawals account for 85% of the wage convergence observed during the 1970 to 1990 
period and 40% of the convergence observed during the 1960 to 1990 period. Selective 
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labor force withdrawals figures to play a more prominent role in the analysis of black – 
white wage convergence as non participation among lower skilled blacks rises primarily 
due to increasing rates of incarceration among this group. 
 
2.2.2 Differences in the Returns to Experience 
Human capital theory posits that wages should rise with years of schooling and 
labor market experience. Much attention has been paid to how racial differences in the 
quality and quantity of schooling and academic achievement effect the black – white 
wage gap.1 However, racial differences in experience are just as important and maybe 
even more important in determining racial wage gaps overtime. Altonji and Blank (1998) 
contend that accumulated work experience is arguably the most important determinant of 
the distribution of overall wages. Altonji and Williams (1998) illustrate that log wages 
increase 80% during the first 30 years of work experience. This increase reflects the 
returns to labor market experience, seniority, and job shopping, however no consensus 
exists in the literature regarding the relative contribution of these components to wage 
growth (see Tope1 1991; Altonji and Blank 1998; Altonji and Williams 1998). 
Differences by race in the levels and returns to experience may generate differences in 
wages that increase overtime. Returns to experience represent an important source of 
wage growth, and Lazar (1979) notes that differences in wage growth are relatively more 
important for understanding inequality than in differences starting wage levels. 
Black – white differences in the returns to experience have also been examined by 
Wolpin (1991), D'Amico and Maxwell (1994), Altonji and Blank (1998), Bratsberg and 
                                                            
1 see Smith and Welch 1986, 1989 for studies examining racial differences in the levels and quality of schooling and 
O’Neill 1990; Neal and Johnson 1996 for studies examining the effects of racial differences in academic achievement 
measured by test scores. 
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Terrell (1998) and Antecol and Bedard (2004). Altonji and Blank (1998) argue that while 
there are many plausible reasons to expect differences by gender in the accumulation of 
and returns to experience "it is harder to tell choice based stories for existing racial gaps 
in the accumulation of or returns to experience" (pg. 3207). Instead, differences in the 
levels and returns to work experience may arise directly and indirectly from 
discrimination. Blacks may receive lower returns to experience because of discriminatory 
employers. Blacks may then acquire less human capital in the form of general labor 
market experience because they don’t expect to be fairly compensated for their 
investments. If the returns to experience increase over time, then the lower experience 
levels will be associated with lower returns to experience. Racial differences in 
accumulated experience may however reflect differences in underlying ability. Heckman 
and, Lochner and Todd (2003) have noted the existence of non-separability between 
schooling and work experience in which individuals with more schooling accumulate 
more experience. To the extent that blacks have lower levels of schooling, this may 
generate differences by race in accumulated experience levels.  
 The literature for the most part has shown that blacks receive lower returns to 
experience than whites (see Lazear 1979; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; O’Neill 1990; 
Wolpin 1991; Altonji and Blank 1998; Bratsberg and Terrell 1998; Antecol and Bedard 
2004).2 Altonji and Shakotko (1987) find that across various specifications blacks receive 
lower returns to general experience, and similar or higher returns to tenure when 
compared to whites. Wolpin (1991) uses NLSY79 data on individuals with only a high 
school degree to examine differences across race in the returns to experience. Using a 
structural model that focuses on experience during the first five years after an individual 
                                                            
2 D’Amico and Maxwell 1994 show that blacks receive similar or even higher returns to experience than whites  
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leaves school, he finds that wages grow at a slower rate for blacks than whites and that 
wages peak earlier for blacks than whites.  
Bratsberg and Terrell examine black – white differences in the returns to 
experience and seniority by estimating wage equations separately for blacks and whites 
using data from the NLSY79. They measure experience using cumulative actual 
experience and estimate wage equations using the OLS and IV estimators of Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987), and a two- step estimator used by Topel (1991). Bratsberg and Terrell 
find that wage growth is 10% faster for whites than blacks during the first five years of 
labor market experience, but that the return to seniority is similar or even higher for 
blacks. Altonji and Blank (1998) also find that blacks receive lower returns to experience, 
but higher returns to schooling than whites in March 1996 CPS data. They note that the 
returns to experience in their cross-sectional regressions may be biased by cohort effects. 
They argue that if more recent cohorts of labor market participants received better 
education, then they will receive lower returns to experience.  
D'Amico and Maxwell (1994) examine how early career work experience affects 
subsequent earnings. The authors argue that if black and white workers experience 
similar school to work transitions, then they should receive similar returns to experience. 
They find that black – white differences in actual experience explain most of the wage 
gap during the first five years of labor market entry and not differences in the return to 
experience. From this finding, they conclude that early career employment matters for the 
wages of black and white young workers and that the effects of early employment impact 
the wages of black and white workers equivalently, so that eliminating differences in the 
initial levels of employment among blacks and whites should eliminate subsequent 
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earnings disparities. In wage simulations, the authors show that increasing the work 
experience of blacks to white experience levels reduces wage gaps by 40% while 
reducing the work experience of whites to black experience levels reduces white wages 
by 5%. They conclude that increasing black employment levels during the school to work 
transition reduces black – white wage gaps by almost half. This suggests that the rising 
unemployment experienced by young blacks during 1970s dramatically increased black - 
white wage divergence in the 1980s.  
The fact that D'Amico and Maxwell find that early employment impacts the 
wages of black and white workers equivalently diverges from previous studies reporting 
lower returns to experience for blacks. Altonji and Blank note that because D’Amico and 
Maxwell focus on the early career period of black and white youths, they may be picking 
up wage effects unique to this period. Although the various studies reach different 
conclusions regarding the magnitude and direction of differences in returns to experience 
between blacks and whites, the majority of evidence seems to suggest that blacks receive 
lower returns to experience than whites.3  
 Antecol and Bedard (2004) demonstrate that experience explains none of the 
black - white wage gap when measured using potential experience while schooling 
accounts for 28% of the wage gap. On the other hand, experience and work interruptions 
account for 22-31% of the black - white wage gap when measured using cumulative 
actual experience while schooling accounts for 19-22% of the racial wage gap. So using 
actual experience and time out of the labor force instead of potential experience reduces 
the portion of the wage gap explained by differences in schooling by 6-9%. Overall their 
                                                            
3 The difference in magnitude and direction of the returns to experience is partly due to different data and survey 
periods being used and different methodological approaches to dealing with the endogeneity of tenure and experience.  
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findings point to a reduced role of education in explaining racial wage inequality during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
2.2.3  The Work History Model 
The objective of this chapter will be to determine how much black - white 
differences in experience contribute to the black – white wage gap and how different 
measures of experience change the contributions of experience to the black – white wage 
gaps. Antecol and Bedard (2004) illustrate that using actual experience and total non-
employment time instead of potential experience changes the contribution of experience 
to the black – white wage gap. Actual experience and total nonemployment time capture 
more of the heterogeneity in individual labor market experience than potential 
experience. However, it may still not capture all the heterogeneity in an individual’s work 
history. Light and Ureta (1995) note that workers with for example five years of 
accumulated experience in the last eight years, may differ in terms of the frequency, 
timing and durations of their non-work spells. These three factors that may characterize 
an individual’s work history may independently and differentially affect wages. Recent 
interruptions may have different effects on wages than past interruptions. Spivey (2005) 
finds that the wage profiles of men and women are affected by recent interruptions and 
some past interruptions and that women are much more likely to be affected by past 
interruptions.  
The early literature on the effects of interruptions on wages focused almost 
exclusively on women (see Mincer and Polachek 1974; Corcoran 1977; Mincer and Ofek 
1982; Rekko 1993). However, as men have become less continuously employed in the 
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labor market, several studies have examined the effect of interruptions on male wages 
(see Light and Ureta 1995; Spivey 2005). Light and Ureta estimate a work history wage 
model that measures the fraction of time worked during every year of the careers of white 
male and female workers. They find that estimating wages in this manner produces 
higher estimates of the return to experience than standard wage specifications that simply 
include quadratic terms in actual experience. Light and Ureta demonstrate that among 
workers with the same levels of cumulative actual experience, differences in the timing of 
experience account for 12% of the observed wage gap and that timing of experience 
accounts for 30% of the gap that is normally assigned to differences in experience. 
Furthermore, accounting for this heterogeneity produces higher estimates of the return to 
experience for both male and female workers. Spivey illustrates using NLSY data from 
1979-2000 that the fraction of the male-female wage gap attributed to differences in 
timing of experience is negligible and that returns to accumulated work experience 
understate the effects of the most recent work experience and overstate the effects of 
previous work experience. This chapter will apply the Light and Ureta work history 
model to determine if it produces different returns to experience for blacks and whites 
and to see if it changes the contributions of experience to the black – white wage gap 
 
2.3  Data  
The data used in the analysis comes from the representative and supplemental 
samples of the NLSY 79. Starting in 1979, the NLSY surveyed individuals between the 
ages of 14 and 22 annually until 1994. After 1994, respondents were surveyed every two 
years. I use data from the 1979-2004 interviews. The representative sample is supposed 
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to capture a cross-section of non-institutionalized youths in the United States in 1979, 
while the supplemental sample oversamples Blacks, Hispanics and poor Whites in 1979. 
The NLSY also includes a sample of youths in the armed forces, however this sample 
was omitted from the analysis. Of the 12,686 individuals interviewed in 1979 there were 
3,181 white males and 1,145 black males from both the representative and supplemental 
samples. There were 346 and 1,105 blacks in the representative sample and supplemental 
sample, respectively, and 2,439 and 742 whites in the representative and supplemental 
samples, respectively. In addition to individuals in the military sample, I also exclude 
females. The 1979-2004 surveys provide up to 25 years of individual labor market data.  
One of the key features of the data is that over a long period of time, I can observe 
a detailed set of characteristics for respondents. The most important of which are 
measures of their actual work experience. The NLSY contains several files or modules. I 
use data from the main file and the work history file. The main file contains standard 
demographic variables like age, race, education attainment, and measures of actual labor 
force experience. These variables are measured in every year between 1979-1993 when 
the survey was administered annually and every two years between 1994-2004 when the 
survey was administered every two years.  
The NLSY main files actually include two different measures of actual labor force 
experience: weeks worked in the past calendar year and weeks worked since the last 
interview. Information on weeks worked in the past calendar and weeks worked since the 
last interview are collected in every survey year so that data information on these 
variables are missing for the non-survey years of 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. To 
create a longitudinal record of the individual's work experience, I use the weekly labor 
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force status variable in the NLSY work history files. The NLSY work history files 
contain data on labor force activity for every week beginning in 1978 through the most 
recent interview date in 2004. This means that even in the non-survey years of 1995, 
1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003 labor market data is still being collected. When respondents 
miss interviews, information in the work history file is updated in subsequent interviews 
because respondents who miss interviews are asked to report their labor market activity 
since the date of their last interview. Due to this updating of information, there are no 
missing values in the labor force activity data. The weekly labor force status variable is 
converted into an annual weeks worked measure by summing the number of weeks in 
which the respondent reports working for an employer. This is exactly how the "weeks 
worked in the past calendar year" variable is constructed in the main file. The annual 
experience variable I created from the weekly labor force status variable produces means 
identical to the NLSY supplied variable "weeks worked in the past calendar year" for 
every year over the 1979-1993 period and for every two years over the 1994-2004 period. 
 
2.4 Empirical Methodology 
I estimate six different wage equations that include the following measures of 
experience: i. potential experience and its square ii. actual experience and its square iii. 
actual experience and its square and total non-employment time and its square iv. actual 
experience with dummies for interruptions in every year of the workers career v. the 
work history model and finally vi. the work history model with interruption dummies. 
The way experience is measured depends on how the start of the individual’s career is 
defined. I define the start of an individual’s career as the year an individual at least 18 
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years of age leaves school and/or begins full-time employment. Full-time employment is 
defined as working more than 30 hours weeks for more than 45 weeks during the 
calendar year. By 1979, 33% of respondents had started their careers and by 1987, 96% 
of respondents had started their careers. All wage and experience data are measured only 
after the individual’s career has begun so that observations preceding the start of the 
individual’s career are omitted from the regression analysis. 
The potential experience and actual experience specifications represent standard 
Mincer wage models. Potential experience defined as age – years of schooling – 6, is 
understood to be a poor proxy for the actual experience of individuals who frequently 
interrupt their careers because it overstates their labor market experience by assuming 
that once an individual leaves school that person stays continuously employed in the 
labor market. The actual experience specification measures experience as the cumulative 
amount of labor market experience at any point in time. As a result, it indirectly captures 
the effects of interruptions on wages since individuals who interrupt their careers will 
have less cumulative actual experience at any point in time. The actual experience 
specification however, does not allow the effects of interruptions to vary over time. This 
feature of the actual experience specification is overly restrictive since we would expect 
the penalty from interrupting work to decline over time.  
The third specification augments the actual experience specification by including 
total non employment time (the cumulative total time spent out of work) and its square. 
This specification constrains the penalty from not working to be the same and declining 
at a constant rate overtime.  
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The work history specification consists of an array of variables measuring the 
fraction of time worked in every year since the start of the worker’s career. The variables 
in the array are defined as , … … .  in which  represents the fraction of time 
worked  years ago. The fraction of time worked  years ago  is defined as the 
weeks worked in a year divided by 52. The variables in the  array , … … .  are 
defined for every year of data. If a respondent’s career began in 1980 then for the year 
1987 the fraction of the time worked one year ago  is just the number of weeks worked 
during 1986 divided by 52. Similarly for the year 1987, the fraction of the time worked 
six years ago  is just the number of weeks worked during 1981 divided by 52. For the 
year 1987, the fraction of the time worked 10 years ago  is equal to zero because ten 
years ago (1971) the individual’s career had not started.  
The work history model is able to capture differences across individuals in the 
amount of experience accumulated and differences in the timing of this experience. In 
other words, the work history model separately identifies individuals who had continuous 
employment vs. those who had sporadic employment. In addition to providing more 
accurate measures of experience, the work history model relaxes the functional form of 
the wage experience wage profile. The quadratic experience term in the standard Mincer 
models imposes the restriction that allows human capital to depreciate at a constant rate. 
The final specification estimated is a slightly modified version of the work history 
specification that adds to the work history specification described above a second array of 
variables that measures interruptions during every year of the workers career. The 
variables in the second array are defined as , … … .  in which  represents a 
dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has started his or her career and worked 
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zero weeks during the year, otherwise  is equal to 0. The variables in the  array 
, … … .  are defined in every year of data.  
If a respondent whose career began in 1980 experienced only one interruption 
during his or her career with the interruption occurring in 1987 then in 1988, , the 
variable indicating whether an interruption occurs takes on a value of one. For the same 
respondent  will take on a value of zero in 1989 because one year ago (1988) the 
worker experienced no work interruption. The variables in the  array helps distinguish 
between zero valued  that result because the respondent’s career had not begun and 
zero valued  that result because the respondent worked zero weeks during the entire 
year. The only difference between the work history model and the work history model 
with interruption dummies is that the latter is able to control for both the timing of 
experience and the timing of interruptions. As such, the work history model with 
interruption dummies represents the most complete accounting of an individual’s labor 
market experience.  
 Several specifications of the wage model in equation 1 are estimated separately 
for black and white men. 
 
                             1   
 
Where  ,  includes various worker characteristics and  represents 
alternative measures of experience. To control for the endogeneity of experience and 
other variables, I estimate equation 1 using a fixed effects estimator. Under this 
estimation strategy, I assume the error term  consists of a permanent or time invariant 
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individual component  and a transitory component  in which  represents the part of 
the error term that is potentially correlated with the explanatory variables in equation 1 
while  is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in equation 1. If for 
example, wages are positively correlated with unobserved individual ability and work 
interruptions are negatively correlated with unobserved individual ability, then failure to 
account for unobserved ability will overstate the effects of interruptions on wages. The 
fixed effects estimator differences out the permanent unobserved component of wages 
that may reflect unobserved ability.  
The fixed effects estimator is also able to control form endogeneity arising from 
self selection in labor market participation. Chandra (2003) and others have shown that 
low-skilled blacks are more likely to experience labor market withdrawals than any other 
group. This means that wages are observed for a selected or non-random sample. 
Chandra argues that failure to account for the selective withdrawal of low-skilled black 
males overstates the convergence in black – white wages, because the sample of blacks 
workers for which wages are observed are more likely to have higher skills and thus 
higher wages. The fixed effects estimator eliminates any time invariant selection effects 
so that any remaining selection is time varying. If the characteristics of non-working 
black males changes over time then the nature of selection will be time varying so the 
fixed effects strategy may still lead to biased coefficient estimates. For the 1979-2004 
sample period, selection has arguably become more severe among blacks as non-
participation among lower-skilled blacks has increased due to rising incarceration rates 
among this group. Holzer et al (2004) and Neal (2006) document declining employment 
rates among lower-educated young black males during the 1980s and 1990s. Holzer et al 
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(2004) further document that compared to their counterparts aged 24 – 34, lower-
educated young black males aged 16 – 24 experienced larger declines in their labor force 
participation in the 1990s than during the 1980s. This suggests that the nature of selection 
is such that black non-workers were not only less-educated, but became increasingly 
younger overtime. By 1990, respondents in the NLSY were between the ages 26 and 49 
so they were older than the subgroup aged 16 -24 who Holzer et al. observe with higher 
rates of non participation. The fixed effects approach taken here is the approach 
commonly used in studies examining the effects of work interruptions in a panel setting 
(see Albrecht 1999; Baum 2002; Spivey 2005).   
Log wages are deflated to 1993 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Included 
in each wage specification, are variables measuring marital status, whether the 
respondent was living with children, educational attainment, current school enrollment 
status, part-time work, residence in a SMSA, geographic region of residence, and the 
local unemployment rate. Part-time is defined as working less than 30 hours in a week 
from the NLSY variable "hours worked per week job # 1,” where job #1 represents the 
respondent’s main job at the time of the survey.  
Returns to experience may vary overtime and across schooling levels. Katz and 
Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992) and Spivey (2005) have shown that returns 
experience were higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s. To capture the heterogeneity of 
experience overtime, I interact the various measures of experience with dummy variables 
representing the 1980s and the 1990s. Actual experience and its square, potential 
experience and its square, and total non- employment time and its square are all 
interacted with dummies variables representing the 1980s and the 1990s. Heckman, 
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Lochner and Todd (2003) have shown that the returns to experience vary across 
schooling levels. This non-separability between schooling and experience can be 
captured by interacting schooling levels with the various measures of experience 
described above. However, due to the excessive demands that this would place on the 
data, I do not include schooling – experience interactions. Finally, because the returns to 
schooling have varied over time, I interact measures of educational attainment with 
dummy variables representing the 1980s and 1990s. The educational attainment 
categories include: less than high school, high school, some college, college and graduate 
school. The interactions between these categories and dummy variables for the 1980s and 
1990s are meant to capture differences in the returns to schooling over the 1980s and 
1990s. 
 Table 2.1 presents means for some of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Column 1 presents means for the entire sample while columns 2 and 3 present means for 
black and white males respectively. On average, black males receive wages that are 24% 
lower than white males and have almost one less year of labor market experience. Black 
males spend 1.6 more years out of the labor force than whites and are more likely to have 
a high school degree or less. Black males are also more likely to be unmarried, not living 
with a child, and residing in urban areas and in the South. Table 2.2 shows differences in 
the fraction of time worked by race for every year of a worker’s career. During every 
year of their careers, blacks work less than whites. Looking back one year ago in a 
worker’s career, the average black worked 54% of the time compared to the average 
white who worked 61% of the time. Looking back six years in a worker’s career, the 
average black worked 36% of the time compared to the average white who worked 42% 
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of the time. Table 2.3 shows differences in the timing of interruptions by race. In every 
year of their careers, blacks are more likely to experience a work interruption compared 
to whites. Looking back one year ago in a worker’s career, blacks are 7% more likely to 
have an interruption (worked zero weeks during the entire year) compared to whites. The 
differences in the likelihood of work interruptions by race, falls as one looks further back 
in a worker’s career. Looking back ten years into a worker’s career, blacks are 3% more 
likely to experience a work interruption compared to whites. 
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Table 2.1: Sample Means 
 
All Black White T-stat P value Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of  average hourly wage 2.28 (0.63) 2.11 (0.60) 2.35 (0.63) -41.95 0.00 -0.24
Total Experience 7.20 (5.59) 6.58 (5.42) 7.52 (5.65) -20.28 0.00 -0.93
Total Time Nonemployed 2.25 (3.02) 3.32 (3.72) 1.71 (2.41) 66.91 0.00 1.61
Part-Time 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 0.30 0.55 0.58 0.00
Enrolled 0.18 (0.38) 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 0.39 -12.53 0.00 -0.04
Less High School 0.25 (0.43) 0.29 (0.45) 0.23 0.42 17.72 0.00 0.06
High School 0.42 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.40 0.49 14.12 0.00 0.05
Some College 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 0.40 -3.29 0.00 -0.01
College Grad 0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.23) 0.11 0.32 -26.34 0.00 -0.06
Graduate School 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.14) 0.06 0.24 -26.06 0.00 -0.04
Married 0.36 (0.48) 0.24 (0.43) 0.42 0.49 -49.89 0.00 -0.18
Children Present 0.29 (0.45) 0.25 (0.43) 0.31 0.46 -18.91 0.00 -0.06
Urban 0.76 (0.43) 0.81 (0.39) 0.73 0.44 23.04 0.00 0.08
Northeast 0.18 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.19 0.39 -7.26 0.00 -0.02
North Central 0.28 (0.45) 0.18 (0.38) 0.33 0.47 -43.54 0.00 -0.15
South 0.40 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) 0.31 0.46 69.09 0.00 0.25
West 0.14 (0.35) 0.09 (0.28) 0.17 0.38 -30.92 0.00 -0.08
Unemployment Rate 2.90 (1.03) 2.78 (0.95) 2.96 1.07 -22.62 0.00 -0.18
 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.2: Fraction of the Time Worked 
 
All Black White T-stat P value Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
X1 0.61 (0.45) 0.54 (0.45) 0.64 (0.44) -28.42 0.00 -0.09
X2 0.56 (0.46) 0.50 (0.45) 0.59 (0.45) -25.83 0.00 -0.09
X3 0.52 (0.46) 0.47 (0.45) 0.55 (0.46) -23.84 0.00 -0.08
X4 0.48 (0.46) 0.43 (0.45) 0.50 (0.47) -22.26 0.00 -0.08
X5 0.44 (0.46) 0.39 (0.45) 0.46 (0.47) -20.96 0.00 -0.07
X6 0.40 (0.46) 0.36 (0.44) 0.42 (0.46) -20.01 0.00 -0.07
X7 0.37 (0.45) 0.32 (0.43) 0.39 (0.46) -19.31 0.00 -0.06
X8 0.33 (0.44) 0.29 (0.42) 0.35 0.45 -19.15 0.00 -0.06
X9 0.29 (0.43) 0.25 (0.40) 0.31 0.44 -17.86 0.00 -0.05
X10 0.25 (0.41) 0.22 (0.38) 0.27 0.42 -16.80 0.00 -0.05
X11 0.21 (0.38) 0.18 (0.36) 0.23 0.40 -15.80 0.00 -0.04
X12 0.18 (0.36) 0.15 (0.33) 0.19 0.37 -14.91 0.00 -0.04
X13 0.15 (0.33) 0.12 (0.30) 0.16 0.34 -14.25 0.00 -0.03
X14 0.11 (0.30) 0.09 (0.27) 0.12 0.31 -13.36 0.00 -0.03
X15 0.09 (0.26) 0.07 (0.24) 0.09 0.27 -11.83 0.00 -0.02
X16 0.06 (0.22) 0.05 (0.20) 0.07 0.23 -9.76 0.00 -0.02
X17 0.04 (0.18) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 0.19 -7.70 0.00 -0.01
X18 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 0.15 -5.70 0.00 -0.01
X19 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 0.10 -4.18 0.00 0.00
 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.3: Timing of Interruptions 
 
All Black White T-stat P value Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
O1 0.06 (0.24) 0.11 (0.32) 0.04 (0.20) 42.42 0.00 0.07
O2 0.06 (0.24) 0.11 (0.31) 0.04 (0.20) 41.12 0.00 0.07
O3 0.06 (0.24) 0.11 (0.31) 0.04 (0.19) 39.79 0.00 0.07
O4 0.06 (0.23) 0.10 (0.30) 0.04 (0.19) 37.86 0.00 0.06
O5 0.05 (0.23) 0.09 (0.29) 0.04 (0.19) 35.54 0.00 0.06
O6 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.28) 0.03 (0.18) 32.92 0.00 0.05
O7 0.05 (0.21) 0.08 (0.27) 0.03 (0.18) 30.52 0.00 0.05
O8 0.04 (0.20) 0.07 (0.26) 0.03 (0.17) 28.26 0.00 0.04
O9 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.25) 0.03 (0.16) 26.86 0.00 0.04
O10 0.04 (0.18) 0.06 (0.23) 0.03 (0.16) 25.11 0.00 0.03
O11 0.03 (0.18) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.15) 23.49 0.00 0.03
O12 0.03 (0.16) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.14) 22.27 0.00 0.03
O13 0.02 (0.15) 0.04 (0.19) 0.02 (0.13) 20.70 0.00 0.02
O14 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11) 19.14 0.00 0.02
O15 0.01 (0.11) 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.10) 16.19 0.00 0.01
O16 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.07) 13.59 0.00 0.01
O17 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.05) 11.22 0.00 0.01
O18 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.03) 7.68 0.00 0.00
O19 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.02) 5.51 0.00 0.00
 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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The various specifications of the wage equations differ in their ability to capture 
all the heterogeneity in work experience among black and white workers. The work 
history specification and the work history specification with interruption dummies are 
able to capture more of the heterogeneity in work experience because they control for 
how experience accumulates over time, in addition to the timing of interruptions over the 
worker’s career. To illustrate the degree of heterogeneity in work experience by race, 
Table 2.4 contains the percentage of respondents working a given fraction of time by race 
and education categories from the start of their careers through 2002. For example, if a 
respondent’s career began in 2000 then the respondent can potentially work 52 weeks in 
every year between 2000 and 2002. In other words, the respondent can work a maximum 
of 156 weeks by 2002. If the respondent had no work experience in 2000, but worked 52 
weeks in 2001 and 2002 then he or she would have worked a total of 104 weeks out of a 
possible 156 weeks or 67% of the time by 2002. In reality, most individual’s careers had 
begun by 1987. The numbers in Table 2.4 suggest that larger differences exist by race 
and educational attainment in the total fraction of time worked by 2002. White males 
worked more continuously than their black counterparts (94% of whites had worked more 
than 50% of the time by 2002 compared to 79% of blacks). Among men working more 
than 90% of the time by 2002, 62% of whites fall into this category compared to only 
34% of blacks.  
Respondents of both races with higher levels of educational attainment had more 
continuous work experience as measured by the fraction of the time worked by 2002. 
Table 2.4 reports that 98% of white college graduates and 91% of black college graduates 
had worked more than half of the time by 2002 while 76% and 67% of white and black 
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college graduates, respectively, had worked more than 90% of the time by 2002. At lower 
levels of educational attainment, continuous work experience declined dramatically 
especially among blacks. Among white respondents with a high school degree, 56% 
worked more than 90% of the time by 2002 compared to only 28% of blacks who worked 
more than 90% of the time by 2002. The fractions are even lower among those with less 
than a high school degree since 40% of whites in this educational category work more 
than 90% of the time by 2002 compared to only 18% of blacks. The fact that many black 
men are not observed in continuous employment begs the question, what are they doing 
with the rest of their time. For the sample of black males in the NLSY, 20% of 
respondents have spent some time in jail and in any given year between 5 and 9% of 
black male respondents were incarcerated. 
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Table 2.4: Percentage of Respondents Working More Than X% of the Time By Race and Schooling Level in 
2002 
 
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% N
All 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.57 3622
Less Than High School 0.98 0.92 0.84 0.68 0.34 470
High School 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.80 0.50 1656
Some College 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.57 751
College Graduates 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.75 421
Graduate School 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.75 324
Whites 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.87 0.62 1852
Less Than High School 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.75 0.40 167
High School 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.84 0.56 777
Some College 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.85 0.60 382
College Graduates 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.76 289
Graduate School 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.75 237
Black 0.96 0.88 0.79 0.64 0.34 1096
Less Than High School 0.92 0.77 0.65 0.44 0.18 154
High School 0.96 0.89 0.78 0.60 0.28 581
Some College 0.97 0.88 0.80 0.68 0.36 225
College Graduates 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.67 89
Graduate School 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.76 47
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The large number of ever incarcerated blacks suggests that these individuals will have 
problems obtaining employment. School enrollment does not seem to be plausible 
explanation for why few blacks were observed in continuous employment. While almost 
70% of the sample of blacks were enrolled in school in 1979, by 1986 only 8% of blacks 
were enrolled in school. By 1986, the average black male was 24 years old and almost 
95% of black’s males had started their careers. The tabulates described above suggest 
black males face frequent interruptions in their careers and the reasons for the 
interruptions are most likely related to difficulty obtaining work. 
Overall, the heterogeneity in work experience within race and educational 
attainment cells suggests that workers are not continuously employed and provides 
justification for a more detailed description of individuals work experience as represented 
by the Light and Ureta work history model.  
 
2.5 Estimation Results 
Regression results for the different specifications of the wage equation are 
displayed in Tables 2-5 and 2-6. Since the estimated wage equations contain 
nonlinearities in experience and other variables, it is easier to compare the returns to 
experience from the different specifications by looking at the predicted wage profiles. 
Figure 2.1 presents the predicted log wage profiles for whites and Figure 2.2 presents the 
predicted log wage profiles for blacks. The predicted log wage profiles are plotted against 
years of labor market experience. The graph in panel A of Figure 2.1 compares the 
predicted profiles for white males implied by the potential experience and actual 
experience specifications. Not surprisingly, potential experience understates the returns to 
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experience when compared to actual experience. The graphs in panel B of Figure 2.1 
display the profiles implied by the actual experience specification, and the two variations 
of the 
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Table 2.5: Basic Mincer and Segmented Models 
  
 Potential 
Experience 
Potential 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual  Exp 
 w/ Non 
Employment
Actual Exp 
w/ Non 
Employment
Actual Exp  
w/ Interruption 
Dummies
Actual Exp 
w/ Interruption 
Dummies
 White Black White Black White Black White Black
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
pot_exp80s 0.081** 0.056**       
 (23.7) (10.0)       
pot_exp80s2 -0.003** -0.002**       
 (13.9) (6.3)       
pot_exp90s 0.053** 0.036**       
 (13.7) (5.8)       
pot_exp90s2 -0.001** -0.001**       
 (9.3) (4.5)       
exp80s   0.083** 0.066** 0.102** 0.089** 0.083** 0.067** 
   (19.2) (9.7) (22.5) (12.6) (19.1) (9.7) 
exp80s2   -0.004** -0.003** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003** 
   (9.4) (5.0) (12.1) (7.2) (9.5) (5.2) 
exp90s   0.050** 0.044** 0.052** 0.042** 0.046** 0.037** 
   (13.8) (8.9) (14.2) (8.4) (12.3) (7.2) 
exp90s2   -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
   (7.5) (5.2) (7.9) (4.9) (6.5) (4.1) 
nonemployment80s     -0.082** -0.081**   
     (8.6) (7.4)   
nonemployment80s2     0.005** 0.006**   
     (3.2) (4.3)   
nonemployment90s     -0.058** -0.052**   
     (9.7) (8.3)   
nonemployment90s2     0.001** 0.001**   
     (2.9) (3.3)   
o1       -0.102** -0.080** 
       (5.1) (4.2) 
o2       -0.026 -0.089** 
       (1.4) (5.1) 
o3       -0.057** -0.022 
       (3.1) (1.3) 
o4       -0.031 -0.009 
       (1.7) (0.5) 
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Table 2.5: Continued 
 Potential 
Experience 
Potential 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Non 
Employment 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Non 
Employment 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies 
 White Black White Black White Black White Black 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
o5       -0.038* -0.057** 
       (2.0) (3.1) 
o6       -0.033 -0.034 
       (1.7) (1.8) 
o7       -0.051* -0.039* 
       (2.5) (2.0) 
o8       -0.019 -0.028 
       (0.9) (1.4) 
o9       -0.019 -0.053* 
       (0.9) (2.5) 
o10       -0.078** -0.049* 
       (3.4) (2.3) 
o11       -0.037 -0.013 
       (1.5) (0.6) 
o12       -0.001 -0.050* 
       (0.1) (2.1) 
o13       -0.011 -0.061* 
       (0.4) (2.4) 
o14       -0.018 -0.035 
       (0.6) (1.3) 
o15       -0.041 -0.034 
       (1.1) (1.0) 
o16       -0.070 -0.031 
       (1.6) (0.8) 
o17       -0.015 -0.036 
       (0.3) (0.7) 
o18       0.044 -0.002 
       (0.4) (0.0) 
o19       -0.316 -0.136 
       (1.8) (1.4) 
parttime 0.037** 0.051** 0.043** 0.055** 0.050** 0.059** 0.046** 0.057** 
 (3.2) (3.4) (3.7) (3.7) (4.3) (4.0) (4.0) (3.9) 
enrolled -0.122** -0.159** -0.124** -0.164** -0.117** -0.158** -0.123** -0.162** 
 (10.1) (7.3) (10.3) (7.6) (9.7) (7.4) (10.2) (7.5) 
hs80s -0.047* 0.051* -0.102** 0.015 -0.054* 0.062* -0.087** 0.045 
 (2.3) (2.0) (4.9) (0.6) (2.5) (2.5) (4.1) (1.8) 
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Table 2.5: Continued 
 Potential 
Experience 
Potential 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Non 
Employment
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Non 
Employment
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies
 White Black White Black White Black White Black
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
somecoll80s -0.029 0.093* -0.109** 0.041 -0.031 0.129** -0.085** 0.096* 
 (1.1) (2.3) (4.0) (1.0) (1.1) (3.1) (3.1) (2.3) 
collgrad80s 0.134** 0.235** 0.031 0.156* 0.136** 0.271** 0.063 0.223** 
 (3.8) (3.9) (0.9) (2.6) (3.8) (4.4) (1.8) (3.6) 
gradsch80s 0.213** 0.255** 0.066 0.140 0.181** 0.264** 0.099* 0.221** 
 (4.9) (3.0) (1.5) (1.6) (4.1) (3.1) (2.3) (2.6) 
lesshs90s -0.028 -0.023 -0.051 -0.098** 0.030 0.052 -0.017 -0.020 
 (0.8) (0.4) (1.9) (2.9) (1.0) (1.4) (0.6) (0.5) 
hs90s -0.071 0.040 -0.124** -0.060 -0.006 0.114** -0.076* 0.035 
 (2.0) (0.7) (4.0) (1.6) (0.2) (2.7) (2.3) (0.9) 
somecoll90s 0.061 0.090 -0.010 -0.022 0.129** 0.176** 0.045 0.099 
 (1.6) (1.4) (0.3) (0.5) (3.5) (3.4) (1.2) (1.9) 
collgrad90s 0.258** 0.348** 0.169** 0.214** 0.318** 0.411** 0.231** 0.334** 
 (5.9) (4.7) (4.1) (3.3) (7.4) (6.2) (5.4) (5.0) 
gradsch90s 0.360** 0.415** 0.237** 0.259** 0.399** 0.477** 0.298** 0.396** 
 (7.6) (4.9) (5.2) (3.3) (8.4) (5.9) (6.4) (4.9) 
married 0.052** 0.059** 0.051** 0.052** 0.045** 0.047** 0.051** 0.053** 
 (6.6) (4.5) (6.5) (4.0) (5.7) (3.6) (6.4) (4.0) 
childpresent 0.028** 0.051** 0.024** 0.046** 0.022** 0.038** 0.025** 0.043** 
 (3.4) (4.1) (2.9) (3.7) (2.7) (3.1) (3.0) (3.5) 
urban 0.019 0.046** 0.008 0.023 0.011 0.031 0.009 0.024 
 (2.0) (2.7) (0.8) (1.4) (1.1) (1.9) (0.9) (1.4) 
northeast 0.007 0.129** 0.005 0.140** 0.001 0.134** 0.004 0.135** 
 (0.3) (3.9) (0.2) (4.3) (0.1) (4.1) (0.1) (4.1) 
northcentral -0.047* 0.070* -0.049* 0.067 -0.052** 0.059 -0.051** 0.055 
 (2.4) (2.0) (2.6) (1.9) (2.7) (1.7) (2.6) (1.6) 
west 0.060** 0.102* 0.060** 0.106* 0.055* 0.115** 0.060** 0.107* 
 (2.7) (2.4) (2.7) (2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (2.8) (2.6) 
unemp rate  -0.031** -0.025** -0.027** -0.018** -0.030** -0.024** -0.028** -0.021** 
 (9.4) (4.7) (8.2) (3.5) (9.3) (4.7) (8.5) (4.0) 
Constant 1.978** 1.723** 2.089** 1.813** 2.065** 1.820** 2.083** 1.815** 
 (73.9) (47.5) (80.6) (54.9) (79.1) (54.2) (80.2) (54.8) 
Observations 36813 17236 36813 17236 36813 17236 36813 17236 
Number of id 3085 1410 3085 1410 3085 1410 3085 1410 
R-squared 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2.6: Work History Model 
 
 
Work 
History 
Model  w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies  
Work 
History 
Model  w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies  
Work 
History 
Model   
 
  
Work 
History 
Model   
 
  
 White  Black  White  Black  
 (5)  (5)  (6)  (6)  
x1 0.130** (12.0) 0.128** (8.4) 0.136** (13.1) 0.125** (8.9) 
x2 0.059** (5.3) 0.045** (2.9) 0.055** (5.1) 0.055** (3.7) 
x3 0.062** (5.5) 0.048** (2.9) 0.068** (6.1) 0.048** (3.1) 
x4 0.037** (3.1) 0.013 (0.8) 0.035** (3.1) 0.009 (0.6) 
x5 0.057** (4.7) 0.042* (2.4) 0.057** (4.8) 0.048** (2.9) 
x6 0.029* (2.3) 0.003 (0.2) 0.029* (2.4) 0.006 (0.4) 
x7 0.034** (2.6) 0.037* (2.0) 0.039** (3.1) 0.036* (2.1) 
x8 0.027* (2.0) 0.020 (1.0) 0.025 (1.9) 0.018 (1.0) 
x9 0.031* (2.2) 0.005 (0.2) 0.028* (2.0) 0.023 (1.2) 
x10 0.016 (1.1) 0.037 (1.7) 0.022 (1.5) 0.034 (1.7) 
x11 0.062** (3.9) 0.028 (1.3) 0.061** (3.9) 0.026 (1.2) 
x12 0.015 (0.9) 0.014 (0.6) 0.012 (0.7) 0.016 (0.7) 
x13 0.031 (1.8) -0.009 (0.4) 0.030 (1.7) -0.002 (0.1) 
x14 -0.005 (0.2) 0.016 (0.6) -0.004 (0.2) 0.016 (0.6) 
x15 0.001 (0.0) 0.055 (1.8) 0.003 (0.1) 0.056 (1.9) 
x16 0.064** (2.9) -0.008 (0.2) 0.065** (3.0) -0.016 (0.5) 
x17 -0.002 (0.1) -0.009 (0.2) -0.001 (0.0) -0.005 (0.1) 
x18 -0.000 (0.0) -0.035 (0.7) -0.004 (0.1) -0.049 (1.1) 
x19 0.019 (0.6) -0.022 (0.4) 0.025 (0.7) -0.003 (0.1) 
o1 -0.056** (2.6) -0.009 (0.4)     
o2 0.022 (1.1) -0.052** (2.6)     
o3 -0.053** (2.6) -0.022 (1.1)     
o4 -0.003 (0.1) -0.007 (0.4)     
o5 -0.021 (1.0) -0.040 (2.0)     
o6 -0.008 (0.4) -0.036 (1.7)     
o7 -0.049* (2.2) -0.024 (1.1)     
o8 0.004 (0.2) -0.012 (0.5)     
o9 0.031 (1.2) -0.090** (3.8)     
o10 -0.050 (1.9) -0.020 (0.8)     
o11 0.003 (0.1) 0.004 (0.1)     
o12 0.037 (1.3) -0.039 (1.4)     
o13 0.026 (0.8) -0.067* (2.3)     
o14 0.011 (0.3) -0.025 (0.8)     
o15 0.004 (0.1) -0.042 (1.1)     
o16 0.005 (0.1) 0.011 (0.2)     
o17 0.032 (0.5) 0.048 (0.8)     
o18 0.181 (1.6) 0.083 (1.0)     
o19 -0.070 (0.4) -0.106 (1.0)     
parttime 0.042** (3.5) 0.065** (4.3) 0.041** (3.4) 0.064** (4.2) 
enrolled -0.112** (9.1) -0.157** (7.1) -0.112** (9.1) -0.155** (7.0) 
hs80s -0.067** (3.0) 0.044 (1.7) -0.071** (3.2) 0.027 (1.0) 
somecoll80s -0.071* (2.4) 0.060 (1.4) -0.078** (2.7) 0.023 (0.5) 
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Table 2.6: Continued 
 
Work History 
Model  w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies  
Work History 
Model  w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies  
Work 
History 
Model   
 
  
Work 
History 
Model   
 
  
 White  Black  White  Black  
 (4)  (4)  (5)  (5)  
collgrad80s 0.071 (1.9) 0.245** (3.9) 0.063 (1.7) 0.196** (3.2) 
gradsch80s 0.112* (2.5) 0.190* (2.2) 0.104* (2.3) 0.128 (1.5) 
lesshs90s -0.104** (6.1) -0.061** (2.8) -0.106** (6.3) -0.095** (4.5) 
hs90s -0.158** (6.4) -0.012 (0.4) -0.162** (6.8) -0.055 (1.9) 
somecoll90s -0.035 (1.2) 0.017 (0.4) -0.043 (1.4) -0.042 (1.0) 
collgrad90s 0.146** (3.8) 0.275** (4.4) 0.134** (3.5) 0.211** (3.5) 
gradsch90s 0.207** (4.8) 0.335** (4.3) 0.196** (4.6) 0.258** (3.4) 
married 0.050** (6.1) 0.062** (4.5) 0.049** (5.9) 0.060** (4.4) 
childpresent 0.017 (1.9) 0.035** (2.7) 0.016 (1.8) 0.035** (2.7) 
urban 0.011 (1.1) 0.031 (1.7) 0.014 (1.3) 0.031 (1.7) 
northeast -0.001 (0.0) 0.117** (3.3) -0.001 (0.0) 0.121** (3.4) 
northcentral -0.042* (2.1) 0.116** (3.2) -0.039 (1.9) 0.123** (3.4) 
west 0.057* (2.4) 0.118** (2.6) 0.057* (2.4) 0.111* (2.5) 
unemp rate  -0.036** (10.6) -0.027** (5.0) -0.035** (10.5) -0.023** (4.4) 
Constant 2.132** (77.8) 1.837** (53.2) 2.125** (77.8) 1.825** (53.3) 
Observations 33012  14760  33012  14760  
Number id 2976  1340  2976  1340  
R-squared 0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Figure 2.1: Predicted Log Wage Profiles (Whites)  
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Figure 2.1: Continued  
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actual experience specification: one that includes total non-employment time and another 
that includes interruption dummies. The graphs illustrate that the actual experience 
specification produces higher returns to experience than both the actual experience 
specification with total non-employment time and the actual experience specification 
with interruption dummies. During the first ten years of experience, the actual experience 
specification produces wages that are 10% higher than wages under the actual experience 
specification with total non-employment time and between 11 and 14 years of experience 
wages are 20% higher under the actual experience specification than under the actual 
experience specification that includes total non-employment time. This finding suggests 
that not accounting for time out of the labor market overstates the returns to experience. 
Comparing the actual experience specification that includes total non-employment time 
to the actual experience specification with interruption dummies, suggests that the timing 
of interruptions matters and that failure to account for it understates the returns to 
experience.  
Finally, panel C of Figure 2.1 compares the actual experience specification to the 
work history model and the work history model that includes interruption dummies. At 
low levels of experience, the predicted log wage profile from the work history 
specification closely tracks the wage profile from the actual experience specification. 
However, at 8 or more years of experience, the work history model produces higher 
returns to experience than the actual experience model. Between 10 and 19 years of 
experience, wages are 6 to 9 percentage points higher under the work history model than 
under the actual experience model. This suggests that using more detailed measures of 
experience matters more at higher levels of experience than at lower levels of experience 
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(a finding that is similar to Spivey 2005). The work history model and the work history 
model that includes interruption dummies produces nearly identical wage profiles for 
whites suggesting that once timing of experience is accounted for, the timing of 
interruptions is not important for white wage growth.  
Figure 2.2 displays the black log wage profiles implied by the different 
specifications of the wage equation. As expected, the potential experience specification 
understates the return to experience when compared to the actual experience specification 
(see panel A, Figure 2.2). Just as in the white log wage profiles, the actual experience 
specification overstates the returns to experience compared to the modified actual 
experience specifications that include total non- employment time and interruption 
dummies (see panel B, Figure 2.2). Again, this suggests that not accounting for time out 
of work overstates the returns to experience. The actual experience specification with 
interruption dummies produces higher returns to experience than the actual experience 
specification with total non-employment time which again suggests that not accounting 
for the timing of an interruption, understates the return to experience. The wage profile 
from the work history specification (see panel C, Figure 2.2) closely tracks the wage 
profile from the actual experience specification at all levels of experience (except at 24 or 
more years of experience where the actual experience specification produces higher 
returns to experience). This suggests that timing of experience does not matter for black 
wage growth and contrasts with trends observed in the white log wage profile showing 
that timing of experience matters for white wage growth. It is not clear why timing of 
experience would matter for white wage growth, but not black wage growth 
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Finally, the black work history specification produces higher returns to experience 
than the black work history specification that includes interruptions dummies. This 
suggests that the effects of timing of experience on black wage growth are distinct from 
the effects of timing of 
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Log Wage Profiles (Black) 
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Figure 2.2: Continued 
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 interruptions, and that failure to account for the timing of interruptions overstates the 
returns to experience for blacks. 
Overall the results suggest that time spent not working and the timing of such 
interruptions matters for both black and white wage growth. However, the timing of 
experience seems to matter for white wage growth, but not for black wage growth. Once 
the timing of experience is accounted for, the timing of interruptions has no effect on 
white wage growth but does matter for black wage growth. In other words, there is 
additional heterogeneity within the timing of experience that is being picked up by the 
timing of interruptions. Perhaps, it is not surprising that the timing of interruptions 
matters more for black wage growth than white wage growth since blacks are 6 % to 7% 
more likely to experience interruptions early in their careers (see Table 2.3). 
One of the main purposes of this chapter is to examine whether using the more 
complete measures of experience provided in the work history model changes the 
conclusions regarding the sources of the black – white wage gap. To examine this 
question, I estimate Blinder-Oaxaca wage decompositions for various specifications of 
the wage equation. The Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition decomposes the wage gap 
into differences in characteristics and differences in the prices of characteristics. The 
results of the wage decompositions are presented in Table 2.7. The portion of the wage 
gap explained by differences in characteristics increases as one moves from the potential 
experience to actual experience specification with interruption dummies. Under the actual 
experience specification with interruption dummies, differences in characteristics explain 
half of the black – white wage differential. Under the actual experience specification with 
interruption dummies, differences in characteristics explain slightly less than 40 % of the 
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wage differential. Moreover, under the work history model with interruption dummies, 
characteristics 
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Table 2.7: Decomposition Results  
     
 Potential 
Experience 
 
Actual 
Experience 
 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Total 
Nonemployment 
Actual 
Experience w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies 
 
Work 
History w/ 
Interruption 
Dummies 
Work 
History  
 
Amount attributable:  -2.2 -4.2 -1.2 -3.5 -6.3 -6.8 
due to endowments (E):   3.9 6.8 12.0 9.0 10.1 8.5 
due to coefficients (C):   -6.0 -11.0 -13.2 -12.5 -16.4 -15.3 
Shift coefficient (U):   25.5 27.5 24.5 26.8 29.4 29.9 
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}:   23.3 23.3 23.3 23.3 23.1 23.1 
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 19.5 16.6 11.4 14.3 13.0 14.6 
Endowments as % total (E/R):   16.5 29.0 51.4 38.7 43.7 36.9 
Discrimination as % total (D/R): 83.5 71.0 48.6 61.3 56.3 63.1 
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explain a little more than 40% of the wage differential. Finally, under the work history 
model characteristics, explain less than 40% of the wage differential.  
The portion of the gap not explained by characteristics is often attributed to 
discrimination. Under the potential and actual experience specifications, as much as 70 – 
80% of the black – white wage differential is attributed to discrimination. Accounting for 
the total number of interruptions, the timing of interruptions, the timing of experience, 
and collectively the timing of experience and interruptions suggests that 50 – 60% of the 
wage differential can potentially be explained by discrimination. The portion of the wage 
differential attributable to discrimination includes differences across race in the intercepts 
and coefficients from the wage equations. Indeed most of the wage differential is being 
driven by differences across race in the intercepts of the wage equations or in other words 
differences in the conditional mean. This can been seen in Table 2.7 which shows that 
while the raw wage differential is 23 percentage points, and differences in the intercepts 
or shift coefficients are between 25 and 30 percentage points.4 The fact that the wage gap 
is being driven by differences in the intercepts is demonstrated in Figure 2.3. For each 
specification of the wage equation, Figure 2.3 displays the predicted log wage profiles for 
blacks and whites. For both blacks and whites two sets of predicted profiles are displayed 
in each panel of Figure 2.3. The first set of predicted wage profiles are constructed from 
the sum of the predicted intercepts, the predicted individual fixed effects, and the 
predicted experience coefficients multiplied by the average levels of experience. In this 
way, the predicted profiles represent the predicted wage levels and not the predicted 
changes in wages. The second set of profiles are constructed from the predicted 
                                                            
4 The portion of the wage differential attributable to the differences in the coefficients of the characteristics is negative 
suggesting that blacks received higher prices than whites for their labor market characteristics  
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experience coefficients multiplied by the average levels of experience. The profiles omit 
the intercept or constant part of the wage  
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Figure 2.3: Total and Partially Predicted Log Wage Profiles 
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Figure 2.3: Continued 
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Figure 2.3: Continued 
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equation. These profiles plotted for blacks and whites give a clearer picture of how the 
returns to experience vary across race. The second set of profiles in each panel of Figure 
2.3 show that regardless of how the wage equation is specified once the intercept or 
constant term is removed from the predicted profiles, the distance between the profiles 
shrinks suggesting that a significant fraction of the wage differential is being driven by 
differences in the conditional mean.  
The predicted profiles from the potential experience specification show that 
netting out the constant term and predicting wages using only the returns and average 
levels of potential experience, causes the wage differential to shrink and increase over 
time. The log wage profiles implied by predicting wages using the returns and average 
levels of actual experience demonstrates the same thing. Almost all of the gap in wages 
under the actual experience specification is driven by the constant regression term and 
netting this out causes the predicted log wages profiles to line up. This suggests that 
blacks and whites receive similar returns to actual experience. The wage profiles under 
the actual experience specification with total non-employment time and the actual 
experience specification with interruption dummies almost "line up" when the constant 
term is netted out of the predicted profiles. There is only a small difference in the residual 
profiles suggesting that the differences in returns to experience under these specifications 
are not large. Finally, the predicted profiles under the work history specification and the 
work history specification with interruption dummies suggest that netting out the constant 
term dramatically reduces the wage differential however the residual profiles show an 
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increasing differential overtime suggesting that under these specifications, whites receive 
slightly higher returns to experience.5   
 
2.6  Discussion 
The findings of this chapter suggest that the black – white wage gap is primarily 
driven by constant differences between blacks and whites that may reflect differences in 
unobserved skill attributes and or discrimination. In contrast, differences in labor market 
returns explain relatively little of the wage gap. This finding is robust across various 
specifications of the wage equation that include very detailed measures of experience. If 
differences in the intercepts represent differences in unobserved skill attributes, then the 
results suggest that the reasons for the wage gap occur prior to labor market entry. Under 
this interpretation, the results are consistent with Neal and Johnson’s (1995) finding that 
"premarket factors" represented by black – white differences in AFQT scores account for 
most of the black – white wage differential. Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov (2005) 
argue that controlling for AFQT does not explain black – white differences in wages, and 
that the wage gap actually increases when controlling for schooling levels at the time the 
AFQT is taken. They argue that the large ability gaps reflected by either AFQT or AFQT 
adjusted for schooling may be driven factors related to family background. They offer 
evidence in support of this hypothesis by noting that ability gaps occur early in childhood 
and widen as schooling increases. They show that relative to the initial gap, differences in 
the quality of schooling account for a negligible portion of the growth in ability gaps and 
                                                            
5 Predicted wage profiles were also plotted separately be education categories. Under the actual experience and work 
history specifications the wage gaps were largest among those with high school degree followed by those with either 
less than a high school degree and some college education. Small wage gaps emerge between blacks and whites with a 
college degree however,  the predicted profiles are quite noisy.  Finally among blacks and whites with a graduate 
blacks appear to have slightly higher wage profiles 
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that the returns to improvements in school quality will be lower than returns to policies 
that target early childhood ability gaps.  
Alternatively differences in the intercepts may reflect lower reservations wages of 
blacks due to discrimination. The presence of discriminatory employers may result in 
lower offer rates and higher search costs both of which will result in lower reservation 
wages for blacks. Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) illustrate that discriminatory 
employers may post wage offers in predominately white social networks raising black 
search costs. The higher search costs faced by blacks reduces their bargaining power and 
results in lower reservation wages. If this hypothesis is true, then anti-discrimination 
policies mandating that employers post offers in black social networks may reduces the 
racial differences in reservations wages and possible the black - white differences in 
intercepts.  
Finally, I find that time spent not working and the timing of such interruptions 
matters for both black and white wage growth. I also find that the timing of experience is 
important for white wage growth, but not black wage growth and that after controlling for 
timing of experience, the timing of interruptions has no effect on white wage growth, but 
does matter for black wage growth. With respect to the wage gap, accounting for the 
timing of experience alone and timing of experience in conjunction with the timing of 
interruptions, results in a larger absolute wage gap that increases over time when 
compared to the wage gap estimated from the standard Mincer model with actual 
experience.  
 
Copyright © Nola Ogunro 2009 
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CHAPTER 3. The Effects of Local Incarceration Rates on the Wages of Never 
Incarcerated Blacks 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The negative effects of incarceration on the labor market outcomes of ex 
offenders have been extensively documented (see Grogger 1995, Kling 1999, Lott 1990, 
and Waldfogel 1994 among others). However, it is possible that never incarcerated 
individuals may be negatively affected by incarceration in general if employers are 
unable to distinguish between incarcerated and never incarcerated individuals. This is 
because employers are reluctant to hire ex –offenders and in the absence of formal 
screens, they may form perceptions about the likelihood that current and prospective 
workers have criminal backgrounds based on the individuals observed attributes such as 
education, age, race, and gender. This statistical discrimination may negatively affect the 
labor market outcomes of never incarcerated individuals if they come from a 
demographic group that has a large fraction of incarcerated individuals. The labor market 
outcomes of never incarcerated individuals from a particular demographic group may 
also suffer if employers have distaste for this group and discriminate against them. This is 
what Becker calls taste-based discrimination. 
Raphael (2004) using Census data from 1970 to 2000 examines correlations 
between the fraction of non-institutionalized employed males in age - race – education 
cells, and the fraction of institutionalized males in the same cells. He finds a strong 
negative relationship between the fraction of non-institutionalized employed males and 
the fraction of institutionalized males. Raphael shows that increases in the fraction of 
institutionalized black males can explain up to half of the drop in black male employment 
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relative to whites. This chapter is similar in spirit to Raphael, except that I examine the 
relationship between the fraction of incarcerated black males and the wages of never 
incarcerated black males.  
Much of the previous literature examining the effects of incarceration on wages 
compares the wages of the previously incarcerated with the wages of the never 
incarcerated. For the purposes of testing for statistical discrimination, I compare the 
wages of workers who reside in areas with high rates of black incarceration to the wages 
of workers residing in areas with lower rates of black incarceration. In some sense, I am 
comparing how differences in a potential labor market attribute (the number of ex 
offenders in an area) affects the wages of a subgroup of workers (low skilled young black 
males). In contrast to Raphael, this chapter examines information that may affect 
employer decisions in more local labor markets (i.e. at the county level). The focus on 
county incarceration rates is more arguably relevant for employer decisions. The primary 
data used for the analysis comes from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youths 
(NLSY). The NLSY data is merged with data on county incarceration rates from the 
Annual Survey of Jails (ASJ).  
I find little evidence that the fraction of blacks incarcerated in a county negatively 
affects the wages of never incarcerated blacks. Increases in the black county incarceration 
rates reduces wages by 13% for all black males and by roughly 15% for black males with 
either a high school degree or some college education. The results however are not robust 
to the inclusion of year effects which causes the coefficient on the black county 
incarceration rate to decline in half and lose statistical significance. The direction of the 
effect however remains negative. While the negative wage effect of the black county 
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incarceration rate appears consistent with the idea of statistical discrimination, the lack of 
significance of these effects when year effects are accounted for suggests that there are 
important macroeconomic effects in areas with higher incarceration rates.  
 
3.2 Background  
3.2.1 Previous literature 
Previous studies have sought to quantify the effects of incarceration on the wages 
and employment of subsequently released inmates. The earnings loss to ex-offenders 
from incarceration has been estimated at between 10-30% (see Grogger 1995, Kling 
1999, Lott 1990, and Waldfogel 1994). Many of these studies often match administrative 
data on arrests with administrative employment data obtained from unemployment 
insurance records (see Grogger 1992; Grogger 1995; Kling 1999; Lott 1990; Waldfogel 
1994a). Other studies have used survey data, most notably the NLSY and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which contain self reported measures of arrests and convictions 
(see for example Grogger 1992; Grogger 1995; Freeman 1992; Bushway 1996; Western 
and Beckett 2000). 
Grogger (1995) using data from the NLSY demonstrates that men arrested before 
1980 had earnings that were 18% lower than males without any arrests. Western (2002) 
uses data from the NLSY to examine the effect of time spent in jail or prison on the wage 
growth of ex-inmates. He argues that incarceration can be expected to reduce not just the 
level of wages, but the growth rate of wages for ex-inmates. Western also argues that if 
incarceration reduces individual wage growth then it will in aggregate raise black-white 
wage inequality. Western finds that incarceration causes the wages of ex-offenders to fall 
 
58 
 
by 10-20% and decreases wage growth by 30%. He also finds that differences across race 
in the rates of incarceration only account for 10% of the black-white wage gap. Grogger 
(1992) finds that prior arrests create persistent joblessness among young black males and 
account for 1/3rd of black-white differences in employment levels in the 1980 NLSY 
sample. Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2007) examine the relationship between 
immigration, black male incarceration and black male employment. They find strong 
negative effects of increased immigration on black employment and wages; and positive 
effects of immigration on incarceration. Kling (2006) examines how the length of 
incarceration spells affects the employment and earnings of ex offenders. To deal with 
the endogeneity of incarceration length, he uses variation in sentences handed out by 
judges as instruments for the length of incarceration. He finds no medium term effect of 
incarceration length on employment and wage outcomes however, he does find short 
term positive effects of incarceration length on wage and employment outcomes. He 
argues that the later finding may reflect the characteristics of ex offenders and time spent 
in work release programs.  
 
3.2.2 How incarceration affects the wages of the never incarcerated 
Not surprisingly, time spent in jail may affect the labor market prospects of the 
previously incarcerated upon release. The interruption in an individual's career caused by 
time spent in jail means an individual is unable to acquire valuable human capital and 
that any human capital that the individual does possess may depreciate. Ex-offenders may 
be less productive because behaviors learned while incarcerated will be less useful upon 
release (Irwin and Austin 1994). In addition, time spent in jail erodes the quality of an 
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individual’s social network. To the extent that social networks matter for future job 
prospects, incarcerated individuals will be disadvantaged (Raphael 2004). Finally, 
previously incarcerated individuals may be stigmatized by employers resulting in fewer 
employment opportunities and lower wages upon release (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 
2002, 2003; Pager 2003). Some employees maybe be legally prohibited from hiring 
convicted felons (Raphael 2004) 
While it easy to see how incarceration affects the employment outcomes of ex-
offenders, it is possible that if employers statistically discriminate in their hiring and 
wage decisions then increases in the fraction of incarcerated blacks may affect the labor 
market prospects of never incarcerated blacks. Employers may use statistical 
discrimination as an informal job screening due to their reluctance to hiring individuals 
with a criminal background. Statistical discrimination occurs when, in the absence of 
formal screens, employers form perceptions about the likelihood that a current or 
prospective worker has a criminal background based on the individual’s observed 
attributes such as education, age, race, and gender. To the extent that young black males 
are more likely to have spent time in jail or prison, and employers recognize this then 
employers may be reluctant to hire young black males in general unless they can 
separately identify young black males with criminal backgrounds from those without 
criminal backgrounds. This type of statistical discrimination exists because "employers 
lack credible information about the criminal backgrounds of black workers or lack 
thereof" (Plotnick 2004).  
 On of the more direct tests of statistical discrimination can be found in Finlay 
(2008). Beginning in 1997 states allowed public access to individual criminal history 
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records through the internet. Finlay examines whether increased access of employers to 
criminal history records affected hiring and wages of ex-offenders and non-offenders. 
Finlay argues that the implications of a model of statistical discrimination means that 
open records allow employers to identify non-offenders from ex-offenders. Since ex-
offenders have an incentive not to reveal their status because of the adverse labor market 
consequences of doing so, then under open records, the labor market outcomes of ex-
offenders should worsen while the labor market outcomes of non-offenders should 
improve. Finlay finds evidence in support of the first hypothesis, but weaker evidence in 
support of the second using data from the NLSY97. His findings suggest that employers 
possess incomplete information about applicants criminal backgrounds because after such 
information becomes more readily available through background checks, the labor 
market outcomes of ex-offenders worsen. He argues that this informational problem will 
create an incentive for employers to statistically discriminate in the absence of formal 
screens.  
Finlay argues that the lack of an observed change in labor market outcomes for 
non- offenders could be due to the fact that the sample of non-offenders is relatively 
young and may not have enough labor market experience for the policy changes to have a 
discernable effect on their labor market outcomes. He further argues that many of the 
non-offenders may actually be enrolled in school meaning they have "temporarily lower 
labor market experience and earnings" 
Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2006) offer evidence of statistical discrimination by 
employers using employer responses to a survey asking about the use of criminal 
background checks. They find that the use of formal hiring screens such as drug test and 
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background checks, increased employers probability of hiring lower-skilled workers and 
that employers with the strongest aversion to hiring ex-offenders were more likely to use 
criminal background checks. They argue that these findings are consistent with statistical 
discrimination by employers. Finlay (2008) argues that this finding may be endogenous 
because employers using background checks may be more compelled to do so if their 
applicant pool is more likely to contain ex-offenders.  
Other evidence of statistical discrimination can be found in Bushway (1996), 
Pager (2003) and Raphael (2004). Bushway (1996) illustrates that in states where 
criminal records are more readily available through automation, young black males with 
a high school degree had higher earnings. In an audit study, Pager (2003) found that 
blacks identifying themselves as having no criminal convictions were less likely to get 
call backs for low-skilled jobs than whites identifying themselves as having a criminal 
conviction. He argues that membership to a subgroup in which a proportion of the 
members have a negative trait may affect other members of that subgroup without that 
trait.  
Raphael (2004) shows that trends in black male incarceration may explain black 
male employment trends among the never institutionalized and that the mechanism 
through which this occurs is consistent with statistical discrimination by employers. 
Raphael (2004) documents the following stylized facts using census data for the 1970 
through 2000 period: increasing incarceration of black males especially low skill black 
males, larger increases in the fraction of black males that have ever been incarcerated, 
employer reluctance towards hiring ex-offenders, and employer use of formal and 
informal methods to screen ex-offenders. In addition, he documents a concurrent decline 
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in employment rates among non-institutionalized black males. To determine whether a 
relationship exists between these trends, he examines whether a partial correlation exists 
between the fraction of men employed from a particular subgroup (i.e. low-skilled 
blacks) and the fraction of men incarcerated from the same subgroup.  
Raphael creates 320 different demographic subgroups representing a cross of age, 
education, race and year categories and then regresses the fraction of non-
institutionalized employed males on the fraction of institutionalized males. He finds that 
within age-education-race groups, the fraction of non-institutionalized black males that 
are employed is negatively related to the fraction of black males that are incarcerated and 
that half of the decline in black male employment is explained by the negative effects of 
incarceration. This chapter is similar to the spirit of Raphael (2004) with a few 
exceptions. Instead of examining the correlation between the fraction of black males 
incarcerated and the employment level of never incarcerated black males, I examine the 
correlation between the fraction of black males incarcerated in a county and the wages of 
never incarcerated black males. By focusing on county incarceration as opposed to the 
number of incarcerated in state or federal prisons, I am picking up attributes that are 
specific to more local labor markets. 
 
3.3 Data 
The jail data comes from the Annual Survey of Jails (ASJ). The ASJ data are 
intended to provide annual information on local jails and inmates. Local jails are facilities 
that are locally operated and designed to house individuals before and after adjudication. 
Sentences served in local jails are often a year or less. Data are available for the years 
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1985 through 2004 expect for the years 1988, 1993 and 1999. The data were downloaded 
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The unit 
of observation is a jurisdiction which may be a county or city depending on who 
administers the jails. The sample frame includes all jurisdictions with at least an average 
daily population of 100. City level observations are aggregated so that the unit of 
observation used in this analysis is a county.  
The wage and demographic data come from the 1979 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY). Starting in 1979, the NLSY began surveying individuals 
between the ages of 14 and 22 annually up until 1994 after which they began surveying 
the same group individuals every two years. I use data from the representative and 
supplemental samples of the NLSY over the 1985- 2004 period because this is the time 
period for which data on county incarceration levels are available. The representative 
sample is designed to capture a cross-section of non-institutionalized youths in the United 
States during 1979 while the supplemental sample oversamples Blacks, Hispanics and 
poor Whites during 1979. The analysis is confined to black males.  
In addition to the NLSY main files, I use restricted access NLSY data to identify 
the county of residence for each respondent in the survey. The county identifiers are then 
used to match the NLSY data to the Annual Survey of Jails data. The key variable in the 
ASJ data is the number of individuals in county jails. For the years 1985 through 1992, 
1994 through 1997 and the years 2000 and 2004, the inmate population is defined as all 
individuals confined and not confined that were under the supervision of a facility. This 
includes inmates awaiting arraignment, inmates convicted/awaiting sentence, inmates 
serving sentences, probation or parole violators, and other inmates. For the years 1998, 
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2000, 2001, and 2002, the inmate population is defined as all individuals confined in a 
facility. For all the years of available data, I can identify the entire black inmate 
population. This population includes both males and female adult and juvenile inmates. 
For the years 1985 to 1992 (except 1988 when data are not available), I can identify all 
black male inmates which includes both juveniles and adults. After 1994, I am unable to 
separately identify inmates by race and gender. To measure the impact of incarceration 
on the wages of never incarcerated black males, I would ideally like a measure of black 
males in local jails. Since this measure is not available for all years of available data, I 
measure the black county jail population as all blacks both male/female and 
juvenile/adult. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
To determine whether the number of blacks incarcerated in local jails affects the 
wages of never incarcerated black males, the following wage equation is estimated: 
ln    1  
 
Where   is the black county incarceration rate in the respondents 
county of residence,  is a vector of individual characteristics and  is the 
error term consisting of an individual specific fixed component  and a transitory 
component . The county incarceration rate is the number of black inmates (male and 
female) confined and/or supervised in county facilities per 100,000 residents of the 
county. The coefficient on this variable ( ) represents the effects on black male wages 
from an increase in the number of blacks incarcerated per 100,000 county residents. This 
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measure is supposed to capture the extent of statistical discrimination by employers. The 
vector  of individual characteristics includes variables that are believed to affect wages 
such as actual labor market experience and its square, educational attainment, whether the 
respondent was enrolled in school, working part- time, geographic region of residence, 
urban residence, presence of children, marital status and local unemployment rate. One of 
the problems with using the county incarceration rate to measure statistical discrimination 
is that some individuals may work outside their county of residence. A more accurate 
measure would use incarceration rates in the county where the individual worked. I 
abstract from this concern by assuming that the majority of workers work in the same 
county that they live in. Another problem with county incarceration rates is that poorer 
lower-skilled workers maybe more likely to work in their county of residence than more 
affluent higher-skilled workers. This will overstate the effects of the incarceration rate on 
wages. Other estimations issues include possible reverse causality in the relationship 
between incarceration rates and wages, as increases in incarceration rates should lower 
the supply of labor and result in higher wages. Possible solutions to dealing with this 
endogeneity include instrumenting for incarceration with for example, sentencing 
guidelines for judges. No attempt is made to do so in this chapter. In addition, areas with 
higher incarceration rates might also be areas with higher crime opportunities which will 
present another form of endogeneity. Finally, areas with higher crime rates might be 
areas were taste-based discrimination is more prevalent so that statistical discrimination 
as opposed to overt discrimination is the reality  
 Fixed effects is used to control for the influence of unobserved time invariant 
heterogeneity that may bias the estimated covariate effects. Fixed effects is also used to 
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control for selective labor force withdraws. If selection is time invariant, then the fixed 
effects strategy will be appropriate. If however selection is time varying, then the fixed 
effects strategy will still lead to biased estimates (see Chapter 1 for a further discussion).   
 Equation 1 is estimated for all black males and then separately for all black males 
by the educational attainment categories; less than a high school degree, high school 
degree, some college, college degree, and graduate degree. The education categories 
proxy for worker skill. Equations are estimated separately by educational categories 
because incarceration rates, and thus statistical discrimination affects a particular 
subgroup of black workers, mainly the less- skilled or those with less than a high school 
degree (see Raphael 2004).6 The wage equations for all black males and all black males 
by educational attainment are estimated on the sample of never incarcerated blacks in the 
NLSY.  
Table 3.1 displays means for the entire sample of black males and for black males 
by educational attainment. For the entire sample, 18% of all black males had less than a 
high school degree, 50% had a high school degree, 20% had some college education 
while 8% and 3% had college and graduate degrees respectively. Black males with less 
than a high school degree earned 4% less than those with a high school degree, 11% less 
than those with some college education, and 25% and 34% less respectively than those 
with either a college degree or a graduate degree. Black males with less than a high 
school degree had less work experience than those with either a graduate degree, some 
college education or a high school degree but only marginally less work experience than 
those with a college degree. They were less likely to be married and live in urban areas 
compared to black males with higher levels of educational 
                                                            
6 See Neal (2006) for a discussion incarceration rates by educational attainment status. 
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Table 3.1: Sample Means 
 
  All Less High School High School Some College College Graduate Graduate School 
lnhrwage 2.53 2.36 2.45 2.63 2.97 3.16 
actual_exp 6.64 6.23 6.82 6.65 6.25 7.17 
actual_exp2 58.65 52.54 61.23 59.10 52.86 65.47 
parttime 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 
enrolled 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.21 
lesshs 0.18 
hs 0.50 
somecoll 0.20 
collgrad 0.08 
gradsch 0.03 
married 0.31 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.48 0.57 
childpresent 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.36 0.41 
urban 0.90 0.83 0.88 0.95 0.98 0.95 
northeast 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.18 
northcentral 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.23 
west 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.09 
unemp 2.65 2.68 2.65 2.66 2.56 2.63 
year 6755 1235 3401 1342 567 210 
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 attainment. Finally, black males with less than a high school degree weren’t likely to be 
enrolled in school and were less likely to have a child living with them than black males 
with either a high school, college or graduate degree.  
Table 3.2 displays the black county incarceration rate which is computed as the 
number of blacks in county jails for every 100,000 county residents. The black county 
incarceration rates in Table 3.2 are weighted by county population and tabulated 
separately by educational attainment categories. Table 3.2 illustrates that in areas where 
black NLSY respondents resided, incarceration rates increased substantially over the 
1985 through 1996 period. For example, the number of blacks incarcerated in county jails 
for every 100,000 residents increased from 83 per 100,000 county residents in 1985 to 
131 per 100,000 residents by 1989, an increase of almost 60%. Over the 1990 through 
1996 period, the number of blacks in county jails increased from 131 per 100,000 
residents to 165 per 100,000 residents, an increase of almost 30%. Over the 1985 through 
1989 period, blacks with a college degree and blacks with a high school degree tended to 
reside in areas that experienced the largest increases in the black county jail population. 
Incarceration rates increased by roughly 90% in areas where black males with a college 
degree resided and by 54% in areas where black males with a high school degree resided. 
Over the 1990 through 1996 period, however black males with less than a high school 
degree tended to reside in areas that witnessed the largest increases in black county 
incarceration rates. Incarceration rates in areas where blacks with less than a high school 
degree resided increased by 50% over this period compared to increases of 26% and 23% 
in areas where blacks males with either a high school degree and some college education 
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respectively resided. The increase in incarceration rates in areas where blacks with less 
than a high school degree resided was also significantly 
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Table 3.2: Black Incarceration Rates Per 100,000 County Residents 
 
year All Less High School High School Some College College Graduate Graduate School 
1985 83 83 86 79 81 96 
1986 91 91 94 86 85 78 
1987 102 103 105 97 100 84 
1989 131 122 132 125 156 132 
1990 131 144 127 123 158 119 
1991 138 154 131 137 151 118 
1992 152 150 152 152 166 123 
1994 152 161 145 158 168 129 
1996 165 184 167 154 170 150 
 
County incarceration rates are weighted by county population 
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 larger than the 9% increase in areas where blacks with a college degree resided and the 
13% increase in areas where blacks with a graduate degree resided.  
 Overall, Table 3.2 documents significant increases in the number of blacks in 
county jails over time. Ideally, I would like a measure of the number of individuals in a 
county that had ever served time in a prison or jail. This would give an exact measure of 
the number of ex-offenders in an area who employers would be trying to screen in their 
hiring and wage setting decisions. The number of adults that have ever served time in 
state/federal prisons and or local jails is significantly larger than the number currently in 
state or federal prisons and much larger still than the number currently in local jails. By 
using the county incarceration rate, I am assuming that the number of black adults in 
county jails provides information to employers which they may use in their decisions 
regarding the hiring and pay of young black male adults.  
 
3.5. Results 
The results from the estimated regressions are presented in Table 3.3. The first 
five columns of Table 3.3 presents estimation results without year effects while the last 
five columns of Table 3.3 present results with year effects. Regressions are estimated for 
all blacks and separately for all blacks by educational attainment. The results in column 
in 1 suggest that a unit increase in the county incarceration rate (the number of 
incarcerated blacks per 100,000 county residents) reduces the wages of all black males by 
13%. The inclusion of year effects causes this number to drop in half so that the effect of 
a unit increase in the county incarceration rate is to reduce wages by 5%. This effect 
however is no longer statistically significant (see column 6). The inclusion of year effects 
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suggests that the county incarceration rates are picking up area macroeconomic effects. 
Areas with larger local incarceration rates seem to be hit by more 
 
 
73
Table 3.3: Effects of Incarcerated Blacks on Never Incarcerated Blacks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 All Blacks less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
All Blacks less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
VARIABLES All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs 
                      
actual exp 0.049*** 0.015 0.040*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.090*** 0.039 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.079** 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.027) (0.012) (0.016) (0.033) 
actual exp2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
parttime 0.047* 0.023 0.047 -0.010 0.199** 0.053** 0.033 0.053 -0.002 0.192** 
(0.024) (0.061) (0.035) (0.049) (0.086) (0.024) (0.061) (0.035) (0.049) (0.086) 
enrolled -0.124*** -0.067 -0.135 -0.061 -0.076 -0.124*** -0.025 -0.148 -0.060 -0.053 
(0.032) (0.181) (0.094) (0.045) (0.073) (0.031) (0.181) (0.094) (0.045) (0.074) 
incarceration rate -0.132** 0.045 -0.154** -0.157* 0.287** -0.054 0.055 -0.073 -0.110 0.323** 
(0.052) (0.258) (0.078) (0.090) (0.135) (0.053) (0.264) (0.080) (0.092) (0.137) 
lesshs -0.055 -0.079* 
(0.044) (0.044) 
somecoll 0.072 0.086 
(0.055) (0.055) 
collgrad 0.204*** 0.213*** 
(0.077) (0.077) 
gradsch 0.333*** 0.332*** 
(0.098) (0.097) 
married 0.043** -0.060 0.058** 0.027 0.117** 0.042** -0.062 0.059** 0.026 0.113** 
(0.018) (0.054) (0.027) (0.038) (0.046) (0.018) (0.054) (0.027) (0.038) (0.046) 
childpresent 0.039** 0.185*** 0.006 0.057 -0.038 0.039** 0.193*** 0.004 0.065* -0.035 
(0.017) (0.047) (0.026) (0.037) (0.048) (0.017) (0.047) (0.026) (0.037) (0.048) 
urban -0.005 0.041 -0.029 0.045 -0.179 -0.017 0.052 -0.045 0.010 -0.182 
(0.034) (0.086) (0.048) (0.079) (0.136) (0.034) (0.087) (0.048) (0.079) (0.136) 
northeast 0.097* 0.222 -0.125 0.179 0.184* 0.103* 0.253 -0.122 0.186 0.132 
(0.054) (0.182) (0.092) (0.127) (0.101) (0.054) (0.184) (0.092) (0.127) (0.104) 
northcentral 0.022 0.496** 0.099 -0.273* 0.008 0.026 0.487** 0.100 -0.322** -0.006 
(0.053) (0.195) (0.077) (0.143) (0.140) (0.052) (0.196) (0.077) (0.143) (0.140) 
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Table 3.3: Continued 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 All Blacks less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
All Blacks less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
VARIABLES All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs 
West 0.046 0.271 0.146* -0.402** 0.107 0.053 0.238 0.146* -0.427** 0.133 
(0.064) (0.336) (0.086) (0.168) (0.142) (0.064) (0.340) (0.086) (0.168) (0.142) 
Unemp -0.017** -0.065*** -0.017 -0.027* -0.011 -0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.033* 0.017 
(0.008) (0.025) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.009) (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) (0.027) 
Constant 1.912*** 1.833*** 1.928*** 2.088*** 2.350*** 1.399*** 1.599*** 1.753*** 2.013*** 2.196*** 
(0.050) (0.139) (0.065) (0.107) (0.162) (0.108) (0.169) (0.076) (0.120) (0.172) 
Observations 7394 1003 3686 1667 733 7394 1003 3686 1667 733 
R-squared 0.084 0.058 0.046 0.112 0.218 0.095 0.077 0.055 0.126 0.246 
Number personid 965 171 507 257 121 965 171 507 257 121 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 negative macro shocks. Among black males with less than a high school degree, an 
increase in the number of blacks incarcerated per 100,000 residents has no statistically 
significant affect on wages and the effect is fairly imprecisely estimated. This is the case 
both in the specifications with and without year effects (see columns 2 and 7). If 
statistical discrimination were present, it would arguably occur among lower-skilled 
workers. This is because incarcerated individuals are more likely to have less than high 
school degree. Moreover, there is evidence that it is more costly for employers to 
discriminate against higher-skilled workers than it is for them to discriminate against 
lower-skilled workers (see Bjerk 2007). It is worth noting that blacks males with less than 
a high school degree have negligible returns to experience (see columns 2 and 7). 
Interestingly, blacks with less than a high school degree and a child living with them have 
significantly higher wages than those living without children. The premium to living with 
a child among blacks with less than a high school degree is roughly 19% (see columns 2 
and 7). 
 Among black males with either a high school degree or some college education 
(columns 3 and 4), an increase in the local incarceration rate reduces wages by 15 to 
16%. The inclusion of year effects however, reduces the magnitude of these effects and 
causes the significance of these effects to disappear. A unit increase in the local black 
incarceration rate reduces the wages of black males with a high school degree by 7% and 
reduces the wages of blacks males with some college education by 11%. The negative 
effects for workers with either some college education or a high school degree are 
consistent with statistical discrimination having a more pronounced effect on lower-
skilled workers (those with less than a college degree). However, the results seem to 
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suggest that areas with higher rates of incarceration may be subject to larger macro 
shocks because the inclusion of years effects reduces the significance of the effect of 
incarceration on wages. Among blacks with a college degree, an increase in the black 
incarceration rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on their wages. Wages 
are roughly 30% higher for blacks with a college degree in areas with higher black 
county incarceration rates in both the specifications with and without year effects.  
 While the results from Table 3.3 appear consistent with the idea that black males 
face statistical discrimination in areas where they work, the fact that the coefficient on the 
incarceration rate is no longer statistically significant with the inclusion of year effects, 
suggests that macro effects are more prominent in areas with higher incarceration rates. 
In the results that appear to be generally consistent with statistical discrimination, (the 
specifications estimated without year effects) it is possible that the negative wage effects 
from higher black incarceration rates reflect something other than statistical 
discrimination. For example, employers may view these areas as bad neighborhoods and 
all else equal, may not feel compelled to offer competitive wages to workers in these 
areas.  
 As a specification test, I estimate wage equations for whites that include the local 
black incarceration rate. The basic idea is that under a statistical discrimination story, we 
would not expect to see an effect of the black incarceration rate on white workers wages. 
Table 3.4 presents results for wage equations estimated for whites that include the local 
black incarceration rate. For all white males, an increase in the black county incarceration 
rate reduces wages by 10% (column 1). However the inclusion of year effects reduces the 
magnitude of this effect by half and it is no longer statistically significant. The results 
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suggest that there are macroeconomic effects that are important in areas where whites 
reside and where the black county incarceration rate is increasing. Among whites with 
less than a high school degree, a high school degree, some college education and a 
college degree, increases in the local black incarceration rate does not have a statistically 
significant affect on their wages. Among whites with either some college  
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Table 3.4: Effects of Incarcerated Blacks on All Whites 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 All 
Whites 
less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
All 
Whites 
less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
VARIABLES All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs 
                      
actual_exp 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.067*** 0.112*** 0.064*** 0.115*** 0.078*** 0.116*** 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.028) 
actual_exp2 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parttime 0.099*** -0.001 0.231*** 0.077* 0.088 0.101*** -0.004 0.228*** 0.092** 0.086 
(0.020) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040) (0.072) (0.020) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040) (0.072) 
Enrolled -0.106*** -0.134 -0.155*** -0.079** -0.095 -0.102*** -0.136 -0.152*** -0.082** -0.090 
(0.020) (0.139) (0.056) (0.035) (0.059) (0.020) (0.139) (0.055) (0.034) (0.059) 
incarceration rate -0.096* -0.234 -0.014 0.018 0.114 -0.055 -0.198 0.018 0.060 0.115 
(0.055) (0.150) (0.098) (0.156) (0.099) (0.056) (0.154) (0.098) (0.157) (0.101) 
lesshs 0.223*** 0.171*** 
(0.045) (0.045) 
somecoll 0.004 0.032 
(0.037) (0.037) 
collgrad 0.196*** 0.232*** 
(0.053) (0.053) 
gradsch 0.285*** 0.322*** 
(0.060) (0.060) 
married 0.044*** 0.065** 0.025 0.073** 0.056* 0.039*** 0.057* 0.019 0.070** 0.050 
(0.013) (0.031) (0.020) (0.030) (0.034) (0.013) (0.032) (0.020) (0.030) (0.034) 
childpresent 0.030** 0.006 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.028** 0.001 0.028 0.004 -0.004 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.035) (0.013) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.035) 
urban 0.074*** 0.125** 0.104*** 0.085 0.127* 0.072*** 0.132** 0.093** 0.103* 0.140** 
(0.025) (0.058) (0.035) (0.057) (0.070) (0.025) (0.059) (0.036) (0.057) (0.070) 
northeast 0.012 -0.074 0.012 0.082 -0.139 0.001 -0.085 0.008 0.068 -0.158* 
(0.040) (0.099) (0.072) (0.094) (0.093) (0.040) (0.100) (0.072) (0.094) (0.093) 
northcentral 0.004 0.067 0.062 0.002 -0.034 0.001 0.062 0.044 0.000 -0.037 
(0.034) (0.080) (0.061) (0.082) (0.074) (0.034) (0.081) (0.061) (0.082) (0.074) 
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Table 3.4: Continued 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All  
Whites 
less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
All  
Whites 
less high 
school 
high 
school 
some 
college 
college 
grad 
VARIABLES All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs All Yrs 
West -0.010 -0.064 0.126* 0.022 -0.082 -0.018 -0.091 0.108 -0.008 -0.094 
(0.036) (0.103) (0.072) (0.067) (0.088) (0.036) (0.104) (0.072) (0.067) (0.088) 
unemp -0.018*** -0.029** -0.036*** -0.001 -0.011 -0.009 -0.017 -0.036*** 0.031* 0.002 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) 
Constant 1.940*** 1.901*** 1.955*** 1.989*** 2.240*** 1.752*** 1.747*** 0.961*** 1.752*** 1.287*** 
(0.043) (0.088) (0.061) (0.088) (0.098) (0.048) (0.102) (0.163) (0.105) (0.461) 
Observations 16349 2053 6689 3242 2771 16349 2053 6689 3242 2771 
R-squared 0.127 0.064 0.080 0.128 0.173 0.133 0.075 0.090 0.141 0.179 
Number of 
personid 2500 406 1095 562 500 2500 406 1095 562 500 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
80 
 
education or a college degree the local black incarceration rate exerts a positive, but 
statistically insignificant effect on wages while for workers with less than a high school 
degree, the local black incarceration rate exerts a large negative, but statistically 
insignificant effect on wages. I tried to estimate the effect of the local black incarceration 
rate on the wages of previously jailed blacks, but there were not enough observations. 
Taken together, the results from the wage equations estimated separately for whites are 
not consistent with a model of statistical discrimination. This is because I find fairly large 
albeit statistically insignificant effects of black county incarceration rates on the wages of 
whites with less than a high school degree. Under statistical discrimination the black 
county incarceration rates should have no affect on white workers wages. The results 
suggest that area macro effects may be important in areas with increasing black county 
incarceration rates.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter asks whether never incarcerated black males suffer negative wage 
effects from increases in the local incarceration rate of blacks. The mechanism through 
which this might occur is through statistically discrimination by employers who are 
reluctant to hire ex-offenders and, due to their inability to differentiate previously 
incarcerated from never incarcerated individuals, may use observed worker 
characteristics like race, age and education to predict whether a worker has a criminal 
background. I test for the presence of statistical discrimination by examining whether the 
number of blacks in county jails affects the wages of never incarcerated blacks. I assume 
that the number of blacks incarcerated in a county affects employer perception about the 
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criminality of black applicants and workers especially in the absence of more formal 
screens. The results while somewhat consistent with statistical discrimination by 
employers suggest that local macroeconomic effects are important in areas with higher 
black county incarceration rates. I find that a unit increase in the black county 
incarceration rate reduces wages by 13% for all black males and by roughly 15% for 
black males with either a high school degree or some college education. The results 
however are not robust to the inclusion of year effects which causes the coefficient on the 
black county incarceration rate to decline in half and lose statistical significance. The 
direction of the effect however remains negative. This suggests that there are important 
local area macroeconomic effects on wages. As a specification test, I estimated wage 
equations separately for whites that included the black county incarceration rate as a 
regressor. Under a model of statistical discrimination, the black county incarceration rate 
would have no effect on white workers wages. The evidence I find rejects the model of 
statistical discrimination since increases in the black county incarceration rates result in 
reductions in the wages of all whites and very large, but statistically insignificant 
reductions in the wages of whites with less than a high school degree. Overall, it is 
difficult to know if local incarceration rates are truly picking up the effects of 
incarceration or whether they are picking up other things. Areas with higher local 
incarceration rates may be high crime areas in general, and the employers in these areas 
may not feel compelled to offer competitive wages.  
 
 
 
Copyright © Nola Ogunro 2009 
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CHAPTER 4. A Quantile Based Decomposition of the Black - White Wage Gap  
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Researchers are often concerned with the impacts of variables on the entire 
distribution of outcomes and not just impacts on average outcomes. The impacts of 
variables on the conditional mean may differ substantially from the impacts observed at 
the upper and lower parts of the outcome distribution. For example, Chamberlain (1994) 
demonstrates that union membership increases wages by 28% at the 10th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution compared to 0.3% at the 90th percentile. Chamberlain finds 
that OLS estimates produce an average union wage effect of 15.8 percent which suggests 
that the union wage effect is mainly being driven by the lower part of the conditional 
wage distribution. Buchinsky (1994) and others have shown that the returns to education 
are larger for individuals in the upper parts of the wage distribution than for individuals 
in the lower parts of the wage distribution. It is possible that the size and direction of 
covariate effects on the distribution of outcomes may not be fully captured by estimates 
of covariate effects on the conditional mean, since the size and direction of covariate 
effects on the conditional mean may differ from the size and direction of covariate effects 
on other parts of the conditional distribution (Koenker and Hallock 2001). Unlike OLS, 
quantile regressions are able to capture the heterogeneity of covariate effects by 
considering the impacts of variables across the entire conditional distribution of 
outcomes.  
In this chapter, I examine among other things, how the returns to labor market 
experience vary across the wage distribution using two alternative measures of labor 
market experience. The first measures experience as cumulative actual labor market 
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experience at a point in time and is most often used in standard wage equations. The 
second includes a retrospective work history that measures the fraction of time worked in 
every year of the workers career. The retrospective work history allows the returns to 
experience to vary over time so that the returns to the most recent labor market 
experience exerts a larger effect on wages than the returns to experience accumulated 
further in the past (see Chapter 1). Cumulative actual experience does not account for this 
type of heterogeneity. In addition, the retrospective work history model allows for wage 
penalties to be associated with work interruptions and allows these penalties to vary over 
time depending on when the interruptions take place. We would expect larger wage 
penalties to be associated with more recent work interruptions than with interruptions 
occurring further in the past.  
When experience is measured using cumulative years of actual experience the 
returns to experience for whites declines across the conditional wage distribution but 
remains constant for blacks. In both cases these covariate effects are fairly imprecisely 
estimated. When experience is measured using a retrospective work history of the 
fraction of time worked in each year of the worker’s career the returns to experience 
accumulated one year ago are more or less constant for both blacks and whites across the 
conditional wage distribution with whites having higher returns than blacks at every point 
of the conditional wage distribution.  
In the second part of the chapter, I use the results from the quantile regressions to 
simulate counterfactual densities which are then used to decompose differences in the 
distribution of wages between blacks and whites into explained factors and unexplained 
factors. Explained factors include differences in the level of characteristics while 
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unexplained factors include differences in the returns to these characteristics. The Oaxaca 
- Blinder decomposition of the differences in average wages does not provide any 
information on the factors underlying the wage gap at parts of the wage distribution 
beyond the mean. Extending the Oaxaca - Blinder decomposition of average wages to a 
decomposition of the entire wage distribution allows us to examine the wage gap at 
different points of the distribution, and how the relative contribution of differences in 
characteristics versus differences in the prices of characteristics varies across the 
distribution. For example, are differences in the return to characteristics, which may 
represent discrimination, as important in explaining the mean black - white wage gap as 
they are in explaining the gap at the 10th or 90th percentile of the conditional wage 
distribution?  
The counterfactual exercise involves determining the density of wages that blacks 
would receive if they retained the characteristics of white workers but were paid the 
wages of black workers. Formally the counterfactual distribution is derived by using 
quantile regressions to estimate the conditional distribution of wages and then integrating 
the conditional distribution function over the range of covariates to obtain the marginal 
distribution function (see Gosling, Machin and Meghir 2001; Machado and Mata 2002; 
and Melly; 2006). In this chapter, the estimator used to decompose the differences in the 
distributions between blacks and whites was developed by Melly (2006). Melly’s 
estimator is an extension of the Machado - Mata estimator. Both estimators use quantile 
regressions to estimate the counterfactual distribution of wages. However, Machado and 
Mata do not present asymptotic results or consistent estimates of the variance of their 
estimator. Melly derives the asymptotic distribution of his estimator and then uses the 
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asymptotic results to formulate an analytical estimator of its variance. Melly presents this 
as a faster alternative to bootstrapping and demonstrates in simulations that his estimator 
is "numerically similar" to the Machado-Mata estimator as the number of simulations 
approaches infinity.  
The decomposition results suggest that differences in the distribution of 
characteristics and differences in the return to characteristics both contribute positively to 
the black - white gap. However, differences in the distribution of characteristics explain a 
relatively larger share of the wage gap in the upper parts of the conditional wage 
distribution. These results hold regardless of whether experience is measured using 
cumulative actual experience or the workers retrospective work history. At lower parts of 
the distribution however, differences in the distribution of characteristics explains a 
relatively larger part of the wage gap only when experience is measured using the 
retrospective work history. This suggests that differences in the timing of experience and 
work interruptions that are captured in the work history model are important in 
explaining the black - white wage gap at lower parts of the distribution. 
 
4.2  Background 
Previous studies using quantile regression estimators have shown that the impacts 
of some variables on the conditional mean may differ substantially from the impacts 
observed at other parts of the distribution. Covariate effects on the conditional mean may 
understate (or overstate) the covariate effects at the upper and lower parts of the 
distribution. As a result the magnitude and even direction of covariate effects may not be 
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fully captured by focusing on the effects at the conditional mean (Koenker and Hallock; 
2001). 
Chamberlain (1994) uses quantile regressions to examine changes overtime in the 
distribution of the returns to schooling and unionization. Using data from the Current 
Population Survey, (CPS) he finds that among more experienced workers, the returns to 
schooling increases across quantiles, while the returns to union membership falls across 
quantiles. Buchinsky (1995) using data from the CPS examines how the returns to 
schooling and experience vary at different points of the earnings distribution. 
Buchinsky’s analysis is conducted separately for low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
For low skilled workers, the returns to education and experience are larger at the bottom 
of the conditional distribution than at the top while for high-skilled workers, the returns 
to education and experience are larger at the top of the conditional distribution than at the 
bottom.  
Quantile regressions have been used to examine not only the distribution of 
covariates effects, but the distribution of wage inequality. Numerous studies have used 
quantile regression methods to document and explain the determinants of changes in 
overall wage inequality during the last 30 years (see Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005, 
2007; Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val 2006; Buchinsky 1994, 1995; Gosling, 
Machin and Meghir 2000; Lemieux 2002; Melly 2006a). Studies based on US data have 
found that overall inequality measured as the difference in wages between workers at the 
90th and 10th percentile of the earnings distribution, increased by at least 20 percentage 
points between the 1980s and 1990s (see Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005). These studies 
examine the underlying determinants of inequality and how these determinants vary over 
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the distribution of wages. Generally, these studies decompose observed inequality into 
inequality arising from differences between groups of workers (i.e. college educated vs. 
non college educated), inequality arising from differences within the same groups of 
workers and inequality arising from changes in the composition of workers. Machado and 
Mata (2005) introduced a method for decomposing the differences in the distribution of 
wages by using the results from quantile regressions to help simulate the counterfactual 
distribution of wages. Machado and Mata were interested in inequality in Portugal. Their 
method has since been used to examine US wage inequality (Autor, Katz and Kearney 
2005; Melly 2006a), male – female wage inequality (Albrecht, van Vuuren and Vroman 
2007; Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan 2007; de la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens 2007), and 
black – white wage inequality (Melly 2006b). The Machado – Mata procedure uses 
quantile regressions to estimate the entire conditional distribution of wages and then 
integrates the conditional distribution over the range of covariates to obtain the marginal 
distribution of wages.  
 Autor, Katz and Kearney note that while inequality increased at the same rate at 
every point in the distribution during the early 1980s from the late 1980s to 2003, upper 
tail inequality continued to increase while lower tail inequality began to moderate and 
even decrease. Using the Machado - Mata decomposition, they show that lower tail 
inequality was driven mainly by changes in labor force composition while upper tail 
inequality was driven mainly by increases in between group inequality. Their analysis 
illustrates how the factors driving changes in inequality vary across the conditional wage 
distribution. 
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 Melly (2006a) uses data from the CPS May files and outgoing rotation groups to 
examine changes over time in wage inequality. He finds that residuals explain 20% of the 
rise in wage inequality, while changes in the distribution of characteristics explain 
roughly half of the increase in inequality. His results like Lemieux (2006) diverge from 
the previous wage inequality literature which finds that much of the observed inequality 
in wages can be explained by residuals. He argues that this is because quantile 
regressions are able to account for heteroskedasticity in the error term. Specifically, he is 
able to account for the fact that the variance of the residuals increases with experience 
and education, but is smaller among unionized workers and within some industries. The 
implication of these findings is that as the population becomes more educated, less 
unionized and has an increasing share of workers in non manufacturing industries, then 
more weight will be placed on groups with higher residual or within group inequality 
causing overall inequality to rise. Melly concludes that this constitutes a composition 
effect rather than a rise in the price of unobserved skills.  
 Albrecht, Van Vuuren and Vroman (2007) examine how the male – female wage 
gap varies across the wage distribution in Sweden. They find evidence of a glass ceiling 
or that the male - female wage gap increases from the bottom to the top of the wage 
distribution. As a result, they argue that much of the observed gender gap in average 
wages is being driven by differences in wages at the top of the distribution. Albrecht et al 
then use the Machado - Mata decomposition to decompose differences in the distribution 
of wages between males and females into differences in characteristics and differences in 
the prices of characteristics. Their results suggest that differences in the distribution of 
characteristics between men and women are more important in explaining the gender gap 
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at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution while differences in the returns to 
characteristics account for most of the gender gap at the top of the conditional wage 
distribution. Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2007) examine the distribution of the 
gender gap in 11 European countries. Similar to Albrecht, van Vuuren and Vroman, they 
find evidence of a glass ceiling in women’s wages rather than a sticky floor which occurs 
when larger differences are observed at the bottom of the distribution than at the top of 
the distribution. To explain the observed phenomenon, Arulampalam et al. use the 
Machado - Mata method to decompose the gap into explained and unexplained factors.  
 Melly (2006b) presents parametric and nonparametric estimators of the 
distribution function in the presence of covariates. He derives the asymptotic distribution 
of the parametric estimator and uses the asymptotic results to develop an analytical 
estimator of its variance. This is the main difference between Melly’s estimator and the 
Machado-Mata estimator. Melly argues that this approach offers a less time consuming 
alternative to bootstrapping, and he demonstrates that the analytical standard errors 
outperform bootstrapped standard errors in Monte Carlo simulations.  
 
4.3 Data  
 The data used in this analysis comes from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY). Starting in 1979, the NLSY began collecting detailed demographic 
and labor force information on a sample of individuals between the ages of 14 and 22. 
The NLSY follows these individuals annually up until 1994 after which they began 
following them every two years. I use data from the representative and supplemental 
samples of the NLSY for the year 2002. The representative sample is designed to capture 
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a cross-section of non-institutionalized youths in the United States during 1979 while the 
supplemental sample oversamples Black, Hispanics and poor Whites during 1979. The 
analysis is confined to black and white males.7 Although the NLSY contains up to 25 
years of labor market data through the 2004 interview, I use only one year of data in the 
quantile regression analysis. This is primarily done for convenience. The quantile 
regressions could be estimated on the entire panel of data provided the standard errors of 
the estimates were corrected for auto-correlation. Alternatively, quantile regressions with 
fixed effects could be estimated using the method proposed by Koenker (2003).  
 
4.4 Empirical Methodology 
4.4.1 Conditional Quantile of Wages 
In this chapter, I consider two alternative specifications of the conditional quantile 
of wages. The first specification measures labor market experience as, the total number of 
weeks worked by the year 2002. The second specification uses a more disaggregated 
measure of experience that includes an array of variables measuring by the year 2002, the 
fraction of time worked one year ago, two years ago and so forth going all the way back 
to the start of the individual’s career. I am able to construct this detailed work history 
variable because the NLSY measures weeks worked in every year.8 I am essentially 
exploiting the panel nature of the NLSY to construct this variable even though the 
analysis is confined to one year. In Chapter 1, I demonstrate that freeing up the functional 
form of the relationship between wages and experience by including the entire work 
history of a worker produces different log wage paths than those produced by traditional 
                                                            
7 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed description of the NLSY. 
8The start of the individuals career is defined as the year the individual was at least 18 years of age, and/or no longer 
enrolled in school or working fulltime. 
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measures of experience. This is because cumulative measures of experience understate 
the returns to the most recent work experience and overstate the returns to work 
experience that accrued in the past. To properly identify the coefficients in the estimated 
wage equations, one has to worry about the influence of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in the determination of wages. Failure to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in individual ability will lead to biased estimates of covariate effects. For 
example, if more able individuals accumulate more work experience then failure to 
account for more work experience, this will overstate the returns to experience. Possible 
approaches that have been used to control for unobserved heterogeneity in individual 
ability, include using individual fixed effects or scores from the Armed Forces Qualifying 
Test (AFQT) in wage equations. Since the analysis is confined to a single year, I use 
AFQT test scores to control for heterogeneity in individual ability. 
The conditional quantiles of wages are expressed as an additive function of two 
alternative measures of labor market experience, AFQT scores, indicators for educational 
attainment, whether the individual was enrolled in school, working part time, living with 
a child, marital status, geographic region of residence, residence in a MSA and local 
unemployment rate. The conditional quantiles of wages are estimated separately for 
blacks and whites. The  conditional quantile of wages can be written as: 
 
|                                                                                 1  
 
 
92 
 
where 0,1 ,  represents log wages at time , and  represents a vector of the 
individual characteristics described above at time . For a given ,  is estimated by 
solving the following minimization problem 
 
min 1 1 1 | |                 2  
 
where 1 ·  is an indicator function equal to one when the expression in parentheses is 
true and zero otherwise (see Koenker and Bassett 1978). According to Machado and 
Mata, (2005) so long as equation (1) is specified correctly, the entire conditional 
distribution of wages can be completely represented by Q w |z . The section below 
outlines how I decompose the differences in the distribution of wages between blacks and 
whites into explained and unexplained components.  
 
4.4.2 Counterfactual Distribution of Wages 
The second part of the analysis involves using quantile regressions to simulate the 
counterfactual densities of wages and then using the counterfactual densities to 
decompose the black – white differences in wages into differences in characteristics and 
differences in the returns to characteristics. Following Machado and Mata (2005), and 
Melly, (2006a and 2006b) we can consider two counterfactual distributions of wages and 
estimate each in four steps. The counterfactual densities that can be estimated are i.) the 
wage density that would prevail if blacks had white workers characteristics but were paid 
according to the black wage distribution and ii.) the wage density that would prevail if 
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blacks had their own characteristics, but were paid according to the white wage 
distribution. The first counterfactual density is obtained by:  
 
i. randomly drawing ,  times with replacement from the uniform 
distribution  
ii. using quantile regressions of  on  to estimate  where  is a 
vector of black worker characteristics 
iii. drawing a vector  from the data on whites 
iv. using  and  in steps iii. and ii. to compute  
v. then repeating steps i. through iv.  times to obtain a distribution for 
, ? 
 
The second counterfactual density is estimated by replacing the data from black workers 
in the second step with the data from white workers and by replacing the data for white 
workers in the third step with the data from black workers. The counterfactual used in the 
analysis is the distribution of wages that would prevail if blacks retained the 
characteristics of white workers, but were paid like blacks workers .  
 
The decomposition of differences in the wage quantiles between blacks and whites is 
represented by  
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The first term to the right of the equality represents the contribution of differences in the 
distribution of characteristics while the second term to the right of the equality represents 
the contribution of differences in the returns to the characteristics.  
 
4.5 Quantile Regressions 
Table 4.1 contains sample means of all variables used in the analysis. By 2002, 
black males had earnings almost 40% less than white males and were working less 
intensively in each year since the start of their careers than their white counterparts. For 
example, black males worked 13% less than whites one year ago, 14% less than whites 
two years ago and 15% less than whites five years ago. Blacks were 11% more likely 
than whites to have a high school degree as their highest level of education whereas 
whites were 8% more likely than blacks to have a college degree as their highest level of 
education. Finally, white males were more likely to be married, living with children and 
residing in the north central and north eastern United States.  
The results of the quantile regressions estimated separately for blacks and whites 
are displayed in Figures 4-1 – 4.4 and Tables 4-3 – 4-6. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 contain the 
coefficient plots of the quantile regressions of wages for whites and blacks respectively 
when experience is measured using cumulative actual experience while Figures 4-3 and 
4-4 contains the coefficient plots from the quantile regressions of wages that use the work 
history model to measure experience. Tables 4-3 and 4-4 respectively contain the 
covariate effects and t statistics that correspond to the plots in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 while 
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 contain covariate effects and t statistics corresponding to the plots in 
Figures 4-3 and 4-4. Table 4.2 presents covariate  
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Table 4.1: Sample Means (2002) 
 
White Black Difference 
Mean SD Mean SD  
lnhrwage 2.67 (0.72) 2.28 (0.70) 0.39 
x1 0.88 (0.28) 0.75 (0.39) 0.13 
x2 0.89 (0.28) 0.75 (0.40) 0.14 
x3 0.88 (0.28) 0.74 (0.39) 0.14 
x4 0.88 (0.28) 0.74 (0.40) 0.14 
x5 0.88 (0.28) 0.73 (0.39) 0.15 
x10 0.85 (0.30) 0.72 (0.38) 0.13 
x15 0.68 (0.41) 0.57 (0.42) 0.11 
afqt 51.30 (29.69) 21.97 (21.76) 29.33 
afqt2 3513.42 (3098.59) 955.91 (1728.58) 2557.51 
parttime 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.19) -0.01 
enrolled 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.12) 0 
lesshs 0.10 (0.30) 0.14 (0.35) -0.04 
hs 0.42 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) -0.11 
somecoll 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) -0.01 
collgrad 0.16 (0.37) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 
gradsch 0.12 (0.33) 0.04 (0.20) 0.08 
married 0.68 (0.47) 0.40 (0.49) 0.28 
childpresent 0.61 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.18 
urban 0.92 (0.27) 0.93 (0.26) -0.01 
northeast 0.17 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.02 
northcentral 0.34 (0.47) 0.17 (0.37) 0.17 
west 0.17 (0.38) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 
south 0.32 (0.47) 0.61 (0.49) -0.29 
unemp 1.89 (0.73) 1.82 (0.55) 0.07 
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effects and t statistics for OLS wage regressions on actual experience and alternatively on 
the individuals work history.  
 
4.5.1 Actual Experience Model 
For whites, the coefficient plot of cumulative experience (see Figure 4.1) suggests 
that the returns to experience declines as one moves from low to high quantiles. Holding 
everything else constant, a unit increase in experience raises wages by 2% at the 20th 
percentile, but reduces wages by roughly 2% at the 90th percentile. It should be noted 
however that the covariate effects of cumulative experience are imprecisely estimated as 
none of the estimated coefficients are significant at any point in the distribution. The lack 
of precision with which these coefficients are estimated is also reflected by the wide 
confidence band that surrounds the quantile regression estimates. OLS estimates 
represented by the horizontal line in Figure 4.1, suggest that there are no returns to labor 
market experience for white males in 2002. For blacks, the coefficient plot of cumulative 
experience (see Figure 4.2) illustrates that the returns to experience are essentially 
constant across the conditional wage distribution. Holding everything else constant, the 
returns to experience vary from 1 to 2 percent across the conditional distribution of wages 
however, these estimates are fairly imprecise as none of the experience coefficients are 
significant at any point on the conditional distribution of wages (see Table 4.4). The OLS 
estimate of the returns to experience for blacks is displayed by the horizontal line in 
Figure 4.2 and suggests a modest, but statistically insignificant return of almost 3%. The 
quantile regression estimates of the returns to experience for blacks are consistent with 
the OLS estimates in both magnitude and statistically significant which suggests that 
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experience has no effect on either the location or shape of the conditional wage 
distribution.  
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Figure 4.1: White Coefficient Plots: Actual Experience Specification 
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Figure 4.1: Continued 
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Figure 4.2: Black Coefficient Plots: Actual Experience Specification 
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Figure 4.2: Continued 
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression Estimates: Actual Experience Model  
 
White Black 
(Intercept) 1.238 0.968 
[2.495] [1.832] 
actual_exp 0.001 0.026 
[0.051] [1.283] 
actual_exp2 0.001 0.000 
[0.814] [-0.084] 
afqt 0.007 0.003 
[1.319] [0.572] 
afqt2 0.000 0.000 
[-0.579] [0.102] 
parttime 0.038 0.017 
[0.466] [0.172] 
enrolled -0.065 -0.277 
[-0.558] [-1.543] 
lesshs 0.030 -0.043 
[0.494] [-0.655] 
somecoll 0.133** 0.023 
[2.959] [0.411] 
collgrad 0.351*** 0.323*** 
[6.354] [3.826] 
gradsch 0.515*** 0.501*** 
[7.968] [4.634] 
married 0.184*** 0.069 
[4.121] [1.310] 
childpresent 0.032 0.198*** 
[0.759] [3.815] 
urban 0.082 0.228** 
[1.353] [2.647] 
northeast 0.087 0.001 
[1.79] [0.017] 
northcentral -0.049 0.019 
[-1.249] [0.327] 
west 0.075 0.094 
[1.525] [1.174] 
unemp -0.077*** -0.018 
[-3.412] [-0.446] 
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Table 4.3: Quantile Regression Estimates: Actual Experience Model (Whites) 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
(Intercept) 0.93078 0.35626 0.79327 1.18983 1.62279 1.67014 1.70234 2.10163 3.32533 
[0.91111] [0.5906] [1.62648] [2.41407] [3.51002] [3.39042] [3.56907] [4.68573] [5.11889] 
actual_exp 0.01622 0.02078 0.01528 0.01108 -0.0029 -0.00964 -0.01287 -0.02855 -0.02603 
[0.4257] [0.78796] [0.56778] [0.43169] [-0.12611] [-0.43663] [-0.52953] [-1.22447] [-0.82336] 
actual_exp2 0.00014 0.00001 0.00027 0.00037 0.00074 0.00085 0.00092 0.0014 0.0011 
[0.11177] [0.0133] [0.30687] [0.45933] [1.0162] [1.20652] [1.1171] [1.72868] [1.05381] 
afqt 0.00394 0.01074 0.00751 0.00498 0.00333 0.00458 0.00619 0.00534 -0.0046 
[0.39287] [1.78325] [1.642] [1.05942] [0.70679] [0.91476] [1.24172] [1.22073] [-0.72566] 
afqt2 0 -0.00002 -0.00001 0 0 0 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 
[-0.16654] [-1.4059] [-1.00292] [-0.38285] [-0.1307] [-0.36487] [-0.6358] [-0.56875] [1.38107] 
parttime -0.37485 -0.43201 -0.46126 -0.37443 -0.34671 -0.19034 -0.00923 0.34861 1.3772 
[-0.71987] [-1.35106] [-2.14896]** [-1.69174] [-2.84488]** [-1.9178] [-0.09324] [4.81074]** [6.70983]** 
enrolled -0.02291 0.0188 -0.02148 -0.04769 -0.08906 -0.07343 -0.05895 -0.05271 -0.13642 
[-0.1054] [0.10297] [-0.14934] [-0.40085] [-0.85621] [-0.76356] [-0.53282] [-0.42954] [-0.47416] 
lesshs 0.06785 0.03827 0.00762 -0.01838 -0.03786 -0.05966 -0.01397 -0.0504 -0.12519 
[0.62395] [0.7135] [0.15737] [-0.3559] [-0.75866] [-1.22326] [-0.32823] [-1.02782] [-1.67496]* 
somecoll 0.17114 0.18015 0.14902 0.12075 0.13655 0.1548 0.18322 0.17779 0.1579 
[2.25299]** [3.77567]** [3.61743]** [3.00692]** [3.59632]** [3.99422]** [4.78385]** [4.12008]** [2.8059]** 
collgrad 0.32605 0.3836 0.37801 0.40288 0.43524 0.43165 0.47594 0.48638 0.42592 
[3.24445]** [5.98883]** [7.38197]** [7.76881]** [9.19574]** [8.49527]** [8.58034]** [8.17694]** [4.69772]** 
gradsch 0.37474 0.42765 0.45649 0.45135 0.4932 0.52056 0.59405 0.67289 0.54159 
[2.40672]** [5.41639]** [5.77136]** [6.73834]** [8.21448]** [9.13109]** [8.25955]** [9.72657]** [6.30458]** 
married 0.14662 0.13369 0.11365 0.13673 0.14444 0.15041 0.12344 0.15409 0.22569 
[1.62005] [2.34553]** [2.87655]** [3.56455]** [3.80912]** [3.53928]** [2.84984]** [3.46283]** [3.65342]** 
childpresent 0.12299 0.11054 0.10584 0.05309 0.05723 0.04343 0.06774 0.01887 -0.05515 
[1.4124] [1.94912]* [2.7173]** [1.44207] [1.7451]* [1.08895] [1.69338]* [0.44289] [-0.98668] 
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Table 4.3: Continued 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
urban 0.10138 0.12742 0.11163 0.09671 0.08035 0.13979 0.05933 0.00814 -0.08214 
[0.86945] [1.58724] [1.35856] [1.47699] [1.75341]* [2.40195]** [0.96018] [0.14892] [-0.97462] 
northeast 0.14641 0.1487 0.16631 0.16094 0.17314 0.12979 0.09934 0.05863 -0.04773 
[1.85426]* [2.87193]** [4.24191]** [3.8884]** [4.60589]** [2.6945]** [1.9529]** [1.1229] [-0.68089] 
northcentral 0.01522 0.03816 0.04525 0.01078 0.02724 0.00638 0.0063 -0.00047 -0.12762 
[0.21444] [0.82257] [1.29768] [0.2726] [0.7991] [0.17361] [0.16926] [-0.01123] [-2.45268]** 
west 0.16069 0.14526 0.12193 0.11707 0.12851 0.10499 0.10605 0.11321 0.05653 
[1.78193]* [2.50943]** [2.40772]** [2.36076]** [2.80699]** [2.33697]** [2.26887]** [2.42515]** [0.75727] 
unemp -0.08605 -0.05887 -0.06469 -0.05582 -0.06162 -0.07082 -0.07069 -0.05932 -0.07838 
[-1.912]* [-2.24014]** [-2.96503]** [-2.94993]** [-2.65705]** [-3.16979]** [-3.35976]** [-2.34881]** [-2.60018]** 
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Table 4.4: Quantile Regression Estimates: Actual Experience Model (Blacks) 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
(Intercept) 0.3498 0.98091 1.60101 1.81944 1.94627 1.74385 1.49503 1.86567 1.96703 
[0.42859] [1.53067] [3.15232] [4.35644] [4.3056] [3.66471] [2.5074] [3.06997] [2.1534] 
actual_exp -0.01037 0.01391 0.00834 0.01507 0.00945 0.01414 0.0203 0.00824 0.02125 
[-0.41232] [0.59048] [0.43166] [0.94803] [0.5705] [0.81305] [1.11389] [0.4547] [0.45884] 
actual_exp2 0.00124 0.00013 0.00053 0.00034 0.00051 0.00043 0.00011 0.00082 0.00039 
[1.26671] [0.13683] [0.68621] [0.5805] [0.81079] [0.64861] [0.15069] [1.18088] [0.24299] 
afqt 0.01284 0.00504 -0.00148 -0.00343 -0.00379 -0.00109 0.00159 -0.00058 0.00035 
[1.37343] [0.71799] [-0.26206] [-0.73483] [-0.74121] [-0.19569] [0.22529] [-0.08045] [0.03636] 
afqt2 -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
[-1.19654] [-0.27993] [0.90478] [1.50644] [1.41859] [0.85104] [0.30446] [0.52392] [0.32189] 
parttime -0.28857 -0.25404 -0.29185 -0.28492 -0.30806 -0.19077 -0.07124 0.2148 0.75057 
[-0.59648] [-0.88971] [-1.25597] [-2.06538] [-2.56285] [-1.80782] [-0.79079] [2.22114] [5.15735] 
enrolled -1.36034 -1.26033 -0.23751 -0.19896 -0.20053 -0.20468 0.06942 0.00691 0.0918 
[-3.07203] [-3.56649] [-0.78492] [-0.77162] [-0.57052] [-0.47529] [0.10975] [0.00955] [0.20075] 
lesshs -0.00645 -0.03393 -0.05618 -0.08997 -0.09202 -0.08113 -0.08684 -0.15904 -0.14738 
[-0.06213] [-0.43579] [-0.99737] [-1.96662] [-1.77643] [-1.662] [-1.84749] [-3.6584] [-2.15895] 
somecoll 0.02156 0.03968 0.10014 0.15055 0.13783 0.1818 0.1535 0.11547 0.07927 
[0.35027] [0.71869] [1.84711] [2.91119] [2.56559] [3.04641] [2.49282] [1.8076] [0.70926] 
collgrad 0.35853 0.22957 0.27831 0.33814 0.31799 0.33515 0.39774 0.4149 0.38727 
[2.05832] [2.4512] [2.83215] [3.93983] [3.69165] [3.64365] [5.14072] [4.76016] [3.1936] 
gradsch 0.59231 0.47512 0.56308 0.5493 0.51365 0.49369 0.48836 0.5064 0.57925 
[2.20024] [2.88541] [4.99311] [7.26008] [6.77678] [5.65604] [4.47832] [4.47599] [4.4946] 
married 0.08549 0.05591 0.02876 0.03802 0.04826 0.01162 0.00672 0.00341 0.05392 
[1.16744] [0.9605] [0.51057] [0.88403] [1.12628] [0.24476] [0.12874] [0.07312] [0.85749] 
childpresent 0.07859 0.12701 0.13149 0.12463 0.14574 0.15056 0.17595 0.16849 0.10683 
[1.0817] [2.33392] [2.44156] [3.02629] [3.65579] [3.58378] [3.69466] [3.15314] [1.57224] 
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Table 4.4: Continued 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
urban 0.20011 0.16568 0.1211 0.11755 0.13707 0.09645 0.12803 0.1152 0.08131 
[1.65431] [1.49046] [1.48367] [1.99803] [2.11683] [1.34006] [1.33344] [1.10489] [0.22194] 
northeast -0.00042 0.05415 0.06838 0.07534 0.0459 0.12833 0.08938 0.15291 0.07304 
[-0.00466] [0.86485] [1.16265] [1.38748] [0.79403] [2.58359] [1.55625] [2.15233] [0.84525] 
northcentral 0.00912 0.07988 0.0381 0.024 0.04189 0.09488 0.05848 0.13962 0.1688 
[0.12851] [1.12728] [0.55919] [0.50807] [0.67147] [1.7839] [1.2403] [2.64432] [1.59997] 
west 0.06643 0.00122 -0.02263 0.1192 0.18392 0.14766 0.18841 0.35138 0.34074 
[0.61447] [0.00999] [-0.19244] [1.51976] [2.20033] [1.19649] [1.63965] [4.58913] [1.28885] 
unemp -0.09441 -0.10462 -0.08742 -0.08714 -0.07387 -0.07333 -0.02476 -0.02963 -0.06641 
[-2.09372] [-2.40825] [-1.97951] [-2.27903] [-2.0784] [-1.95652] [-0.5659] [-0.78993] [-1.60667] 
 
 
107 
 
The coefficient plots of the squared experience terms are essentially zero and 
insignificant across the conditional wage distribution for both blacks and whites which 
suggests that neither group of workers, experiences a depreciation in its human capital 
(see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 for whites and Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4 for blacks). For 
both blacks and whites, the coefficient plots of AFQT and its squared are essentially zero 
across the conditional wage distribution. These results are somewhat paradoxical as one 
might expect AFQT to exert a positive and increasingly larger effect across the 
conditional wage distribution especially if AFQT scores are correlated with unobserved 
ability. It should be noted that the estimated returns to AFQT and its square are 
statistically insignificant across the conditional wage distribution for both whites and 
blacks (see Table 4.3 and 4-4 respectively).  
The coefficient plot of the part time variable suggests that the returns to working 
part-time are higher moving up the conditional wage distribution for both black and 
whites and that OLS overstates the returns to working part-time at the bottom of the 
conditional wage distribution and understates the returns at the top of the conditional 
wage distribution. Holding everything else constant, working part-time lowers the wages 
of whites by 46% at the 30th percentile, but raises the wages of whites by roughly 35% at 
the 80th percentile. For blacks, holding everything else constant, working part time 
lowers wages by roughly 30% at the 40th percentile but raises wages by 20% at the 80th 
percentile. OLS estimates suggest that working part-time increases average wages by 4% 
for whites and by 2% for blacks (see Table 4.2 and Figures 4-1 and 4-2). The estimated 
returns to working part-time are more precisely estimated moving across the conditional 
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distribution. This is reflected by the tighter confidence bands at the higher quantiles of 
the black and white conditional wage distributions.  
The coefficient plots of the education variables demonstrate that the returns to 
educational attainment vary across the conditional wage distributions of both blacks and 
whites. The coefficient plots for the following levels of educational attainment are 
displayed separately for whites and blacks in Figures 4-1 and 4-2; less than a high school 
degree, some college, college graduate and graduate school degree. The omitted 
education category is "high school degree."  
Among whites, the return to having less than a high school degree decreases 
across the conditional wage distribution. The fairly wide confidence band around the 
coefficient plot of the “less than high school degree” variable however, suggests that the 
estimates are not precise (see Table 4.3 for t statistics associated with the coefficient 
estimates at each quantile). Holding everything else constant, whites with less than a high 
school degree have 7% higher wages than whites with a high school degree at the 10th 
percentile of the conditional wage distribution and similar wages to whites with a high 
school degree at the 30th percentile of the conditional wage distribution. These estimates 
are not statistically significant. At the 60th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, 
whites with less than a high school degree have wages that are 6% lower than the wages 
of whites with a high school degree and at the 90th percentile of the conditional wage 
distribution, whites with less than a high school degree have wages that are 12% lower 
than the wages of whites with a high school degree. The estimate at the 90th percentile is 
the only statistically significant estimate throughout the conditional wage distribution. 
OLS estimates suggests that the returns to having less than a high school degree are 3%. 
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An amount that grossly overstates the covariate effects estimated across the conditional 
distribution. For black workers, the return to having less than a high school degree is 
negative across the conditional distribution and becomes increasingly negative moving up 
the conditional distribution. These estimates however, are also imprecisely estimated as 
reflected by the wide confidence bands around the coefficient plots (also see Table 4.4 
for t statistics associated with coefficient estimates).9  
The returns to having completed a college or graduate degree illustrate the strong 
effects of higher education attainment on the wages of both blacks and whites. For 
whites, the returns to having either a college degree or a graduate degree are positive, 
large and increase across the conditional wage distribution. At the 20th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution, whites with a college degree had wages that were 30% 
higher than the wages of whites with just a high school degree and at the 80th percentile 
of the conditional wage distribution, whites with a college degree have wages that were 
50% higher than the wages of whites with just a high school degree. Among whites with 
a graduate degree, wages were 40% higher than the wages of whites with a high school 
degree at the 20th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, and wages were 70% 
higher than the wages of whites with a high school degree at the 80th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution. For whites, the returns to having a college or graduate 
school degree are statistically significant across the entire conditional wage distribution. 
Among blacks, the return to having a college degree is large, positive and 
increases across the conditional wage distribution while the return to having a graduate 
degree is positive and large, but remains constant across the conditional wage 
                                                            
9 Although the coefficient plots for blacks and whites decline over the conditional wage distribution the fact that the 
quantile regression estimates lie within the 90% confidence interval of the OLS estimates suggests that the covariate 
effects of having less than a high school degree may in fact be uniform across the distribution. 
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distribution. At the 20th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, blacks with a 
college degree have wages that are 20% higher than the wages of blacks with a high 
school degree and at the 80th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, blacks with 
a graduate degree have wages that are 40% percent higher than blacks with just a high 
school degree. OLS estimates suggest that blacks with a college degree have average 
wages that are 30% higher than the average wages of blacks with a high school degree. 
This implies that OLS overstates the returns to having a college degree at the bottom of 
the conditional distribution and understates the returns to having a college degree at the 
top of the conditional distribution. For blacks with a graduate degree, wages are 50% 
higher than the wages received by blacks with a high school degree at the 20th percentile 
and at the 80th percentile. The OLS estimate suggests that blacks with a graduate degree 
have average wages that are roughly 50% higher than the average wages of blacks with a 
high school degree. This in turn implies that OLS estimates of the return to having a 
graduate degree among blacks are roughly consistent with the roughly 50% return 
estimated across each conditional quantile. The results suggest that at least among blacks 
with a graduate degree, only the location of the conditional wage function shifts.  
Overall the return to completing college is large and increasing across the 
conditional wage distribution for both blacks and whites although the return is larger for 
whites than blacks. There is however, convergence between blacks and whites in the 
returns to completing college at higher quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
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Overall, the quantile regression estimates suggest that the returns to having a college or 
graduate degree increase fairly substantially across the conditional distribution.10  
The coefficient plots of the variables indicating geographic region of residence 
illustrate that among whites and blacks, the returns to residing in the Northeast and West 
are a lot higher than the returns to residing in the South, (the omitted category) and these 
returns vary across the conditional distribution. For whites, the returns to residing in the 
Northeast and West while positive and large, decline across the conditional wage 
distribution. For blacks, the returns to residing in the Northeast and West increase 
moving up the conditional wage distribution. The covariate effects of residing in the 
Northeast and West are significant for whites across almost all estimated quantiles. For 
blacks, the covariate effects of residing in the Northeast are significant in the upper half 
of their conditional wage distribution while the covariate effects of residing in the West 
are significant at the 50th, 70th and 80th percentiles of their conditional wage distribution 
(see Table 4.4). The returns to residing in the Northcentral United States were essentially 
zero and statistically insignificant for whites across their conditional wage distribution 
except at the 90th percentile where the return was negative and statistically significant. In 
contrast, blacks received positive returns to residing in the Northcentral United States 
which increased somewhat over their conditional wage distribution. The quantile 
regression estimates suggest that OLS understates the returns received by whites living in 
the Northeast, Northcentral and Western parts of the United States across the entire 
conditional distribution. For blacks, OLS underestimates the returns to residing in the 
Northeast and Northcentral United States across the entire conditional distribution of 
                                                            
10 There is informal evidence that these covariate effects are not constant across the conditional distribution because the 
quantile regression estimates for whites of the return to having a college degree beyond the 60th percentile lie outside 
the 90% confidence band produced by OLS estimates.  
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wages while OLS overstates the returns to residing in the West below the 40th percentile 
and understates returns above the 40th percentile.  
Whites residing in urban areas appear to have higher wages relative to whites in 
non- urban areas, and the premium associated with an urban residence appears to decline 
over the conditional distribution. However, the fairly wide confidence bands surrounding 
the quantile regression estimates suggests that estimated covariate effects may be 
imprecise. For blacks, the return to residing in urban areas is positive and essentially 
constant across most of the conditional distribution However, these estimates are only 
significant at the 40th and 50th percentiles 
With respect to the other variables, the returns to being married are positive for 
blacks and whites, but higher for whites at every point of the conditional wage 
distribution. Married whites have wages that are 14% higher than the wages of unmarried 
whites at the 10th and 50th percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. In addition, 
their wages are almost 22% higher than the wages of unmarried whites at the 90th 
percentile of the conditional distribution. The estimates are statistically significant at 
every point of the conditional distribution. The quantile regression estimates suggest that 
OLS overstates the returns to being married among whites at almost every point of the 
conditional distribution. For blacks, the premium associated with being married is smaller 
and somewhat declining across the conditional distribution. The wide confidence bands 
surrounding the quantile regression estimates suggests that the covariate effects of 
marriage are imprecisely estimated. Married blacks have wages that are 9% higher than 
the wages of unmarried blacks at the 10th percentile of the conditional distribution, and 
wages that are 5% higher than the wages of unmarried blacks at the 50th and 90th 
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percentiles of the conditional distribution. However, none of these estimates are 
statistically significant.  
Finally, whites receive a smaller return to living with a child and their return falls 
across the conditional wage distribution. At the 20th percentile of the conditional wage 
distribution, whites living with children have wages that are 11% higher than the wages 
of whites living with no children. At the 70th and of the conditional distribution whites 
living with children have wages that are 7% higher than the wages of whites living 
without children. At higher percentiles the returns are imprecisely estimated. Among 
blacks, the return to living with a child increases and is statistically significant across the 
conditional wage distribution. Blacks living with children have wages that are 13% 
higher than the wages of blacks living without children at the 20th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution. At the 50th and 80th percentiles of the conditional 
distribution, their wages are respectively 15% and 17% higher than the wages of blacks 
living without children    
 
4.5.2 Work History Model 
The coefficient plots described above were obtained from a model of wages that 
measured experience as cumulative actual experience. Figures 4-3 and 4-4 displays the 
coefficient plots from the work history model of wages estimated separately for blacks 
and whites. The work history model disaggregates cumulative experience by measuring 
the fraction of time worked in every year of the worker’s career. This variable is 
constructed by exploiting the panel nature of the NLSY and using the year 2002. For 
whites, the return to a unit change in the fraction of time worked one year ago  is 
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essentially constant over the conditional wage distribution. Among whites, a unit increase 
in the fraction of time worked one year ago increases wages by 19% at the 20th percentile 
and by 27% and 20% respectively at the 50th and 70th percentiles (see Figure 4.3 and 
Table 4.5). The covariate effects are significant between the 40th and 70th percentile of 
the conditional wage distribution Besides work experience that accumulated one and six 
years ago, the returns to retrospective work experience going back ten years ago are too 
imprecisely estimated across most of the cumulative distribution to make any statement 
about how the coefficient plots vary across the distribution of wages. Among blacks, the 
returns to experience accumulated one year ago are somewhat constant and often 
statistically significant across the conditional distribution of wages (see Figure 4.4 and 
Table 4.6). A unit increase in the fraction of time worked one year ago increases wages 
by 12% at the 20th percentile and by 19% and 17% respectively at the 40th and 70th 
percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. The estimated returns are significant at 
the 40th and 70th percentiles of the  
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Figure 4.3: White Coefficient Plots: Work History Specification 
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Figure 4.3: Continued 
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Figure 4.3: Continued 
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Figure 4.4: Black Coefficient Plots: Work History Specification 
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Figure 4.4: Continued 
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Figure 4.4: Continued 
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Table 4.5: Quantile Regression Estimates: Work History Model (White) 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
(Intercept) -0.24198 -0.17872 0.24905 0.5479 0.91652 0.88755 0.9906 1.65164 2.3936 
[-0.21679] [-0.26114] [0.52201] [1.24805] [1.95161] [1.71016] [1.96583] [3.03303] [3.01369] 
x1 0.23528 0.18638 0.22627 0.2346 0.26634 0.19411 0.20201 0.07759 0.24482 
[0.709] [0.85654] [1.43956] [1.72543] [2.20328] [1.76695] [1.8843] [0.67025] [1.22025] 
x2 0.08818 0.07496 0.12854 0.07336 0.05133 0.08444 0.1082 0.25107 0.17537 
[0.25473] [0.3766] [0.93061] [0.5284] [0.41617] [0.76956] [0.93312] [2.25654] [0.89754] 
x3 0.12597 0.09301 0.05884 0.17598 0.15329 0.08585 0.01709 -0.04838 -0.07775 
[0.41318] [0.50834] [0.34151] [1.18369] [1.17042] [0.71464] [0.13146] [-0.37805] [-0.28452] 
x4 -0.00651 0.01713 0.0076 -0.04755 -0.02526 0.09463 0.05471 -0.0581 -0.03914 
[-0.0317] [0.10588] [0.05205] [-0.36722] [-0.21436] [0.86793] [0.51479] [-0.50773] [-0.1416] 
x5 -0.21639 -0.14826 -0.02715 0.02733 0.02925 0.02656 -0.01346 -0.04822 -0.17334 
[-0.87571] [-0.97518] [-0.21319] [0.1935] [0.24544] [0.2543] [-0.13582] [-0.42931] [-0.73828] 
x6 0.2917 0.20065 0.134 0.18043 0.17857 0.2336 0.16235 0.25986 0.27873 
[1.26224] [1.55595] [1.29622] [1.62549] [1.7526] [2.54815] [1.73122] [2.28796] [1.15732] 
x7 -0.079 0.05115 0.09302 -0.00536 0.04625 -0.03343 0.0945 0.20286 0.24184 
[-0.35975] [0.45648] [0.89217] [-0.04946] [0.41368] [-0.28952] [0.85884] [1.98963] [1.33963] 
x8 0.07933 0.06919 0.02063 0.02052 -0.00843 -0.01182 -0.09252 -0.06512 0.10756 
[0.31205] [0.53868] [0.17116] [0.19689] [-0.08627] [-0.1139] [-0.836] [-0.57382] [0.52856] 
x9 0.08885 0.19197 0.24371 0.16921 0.13277 0.07976 0.09956 0.01088 -0.13913 
[0.3131] [1.15436] [1.91469] [1.48393] [1.16506] [0.70056] [0.93163] [0.10826] [-0.94112] 
x10 -0.00488 -0.06351 -0.09971 0.00917 -0.00734 0.06776 0.06642 0.05044 0.03381 
[-0.02531] [-0.42294] [-1.05057] [0.12233] [-0.08802] [0.79259] [0.64932] [0.51311] [0.21814] 
afqt 0.01292 0.01379 0.00925 0.00707 0.00389 0.00577 0.00733 0.00331 -0.00252 
[1.16878] [2.01403] [1.90028] [1.5872] [0.82804] [1.12202] [1.41457] [0.61494] [-0.34953] 
afqt2 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00001 0 -0.00001 -0.00001 0 0.00002 
[-0.85809] [-1.61438] [-1.18566] [-0.84241] [-0.13136] [-0.61363] [-0.7776] [-0.08989] [0.89129] 
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Table 4.5: Continued 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
parttime -0.54748 -0.41801 -0.40503 -0.41313 -0.38243 -0.33146 -0.13248 0.09372 1.33537 
[-0.87296] [-1.25937] [-2.19482] [-2.23364] [-3.30798] [-3.65943] [-1.43671] [0.83426] [5.05621] 
enrolled 0.07752 -0.04657 -0.09493 -0.05092 -0.04792 -0.00998 -0.02559 0.04905 -0.07342 
[0.47088] [-0.29061] [-0.55687] [-0.3188] [-0.36584] [-0.08267] [-0.22498] [0.43396] [-0.45136] 
lesshs 0.13559 0.06501 0.06523 0.05901 0.06344 0.00569 0.01115 -0.03077 -0.02243 
[0.92839] [1.02668] [1.32065] [1.18316] [1.17806] [0.09997] [0.22671] [-0.55762] [-0.21312] 
somecoll 0.19273 0.14594 0.14706 0.13534 0.12872 0.18654 0.18287 0.15332 0.14166 
[2.29076] [2.9479] [3.89073] [2.95975] [3.56202] [4.86643] [4.40335] [3.64143] [2.2845] 
collgrad 0.23916 0.31151 0.29676 0.34414 0.35845 0.39517 0.40345 0.43855 0.40414 
[2.0206] [4.66565] [6.04336] [7.63798] [8.36543] [7.10608] [7.35148] [7.41527] [4.15528] 
gradsch 0.26871 0.30262 0.32828 0.32739 0.36626 0.46148 0.50418 0.59795 0.60146 
[1.61022] [3.25972] [4.28354] [4.91295] [5.5363] [8.5574] [7.8674] [9.2833] [6.34034] 
married 0.15263 0.1087 0.09977 0.14991 0.13862 0.13842 0.11192 0.14421 0.17283 
[1.57905] [1.92015] [2.0681] [3.57801] [3.63936] [3.80323] [2.31565] [3.15798] [2.46256] 
childpresent 0.1108 0.10803 0.09318 0.04713 0.05198 0.03944 0.05293 0.02454 -0.03604 
[1.22174] [1.89211] [1.91228] [1.15302] [1.46718] [1.05279] [1.17507] [0.57234] [-0.66007] 
urban 0.12169 0.13759 0.0498 0.06277 0.10087 0.12117 0.02943 -0.01385 -0.05963 
[1.06012] [1.35411] [0.65239] [0.96622] [2.13722] [2.3367] [0.40917] [-0.18424] [-0.67467] 
northeast 0.13427 0.11659 0.10911 0.17167 0.15082 0.1087 0.11443 0.06534 -0.03503 
[1.55045] [2.08486] [2.51621] [4.21321] [4.15747] [2.41608] [2.22165] [1.30736] [-0.50554] 
northcentral 0.01004 -0.00153 0.01275 0.03449 0.02258 0.02325 0.00932 -0.03941 -0.06861 
[0.11733] [-0.03257] [0.34797] [0.99549] [0.66552] [0.65249] [0.24409] [-0.93687] [-1.1994] 
west 0.04591 0.08891 0.0972 0.11142 0.09954 0.0775 0.11163 0.09344 0.09965 
[0.47843] [1.37112] [1.85062] [2.26467] [2.41904] [1.69537] [2.22059] [1.62672] [1.09839] 
unemp -0.0857 -0.06086 -0.04491 -0.06091 -0.05859 -0.05722 -0.06052 -0.04782 -0.07376 
[-2.05895] [-2.19358] [-2.04031] [-3.00128] [-2.64498] [-2.34383] [-2.74301] [-1.8836] [-1.83092] 
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Table 4.6: Quantile Regression Estimates: Work History Model (Blacks) 
 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
(Intercept) 0.0567 0.64612 1.59401 1.70619 1.96091 1.43488 1.33714 1.19437 1.92035 
[0.0554] [0.99508] [2.95932] [3.43753] [3.96463] [2.92038] [2.07157] [1.75345] [2.07896] 
x1 0.18717 0.1197 0.17765 0.19313 0.16179 0.16982 0.17403 0.10663 0.17163 
[0.76034] [0.84173] [1.6794] [2.03761] [1.71929] [1.8939] [1.96421] [1.03363] [0.98542] 
x2 -0.19801 -0.06897 -0.00402 0.05605 0.16689 0.18787 0.15229 0.1754 0.02371 
[-0.7372] [-0.32944] [-0.02673] [0.43824] [1.5849] [2.06198] [1.79595] [1.79105] [0.14994] 
x3 0.00945 0.08013 0.03187 0.02099 -0.0729 -0.12624 -0.11457 -0.10592 0.07538 
[0.03719] [0.36219] [0.17636] [0.13768] [-0.60719] [-1.29356] [-1.1595] [-0.919] [0.42613] 
x4 0.18505 0.01807 -0.02573 -0.05038 0.01368 -0.08317 -0.13683 -0.21578 -0.22271 
[0.77976] [0.08769] [-0.16197] [-0.393] [0.12141] [-0.88677] [-1.53313] [-2.14012] [-0.95963] 
x5 0.00247 0.04505 0.04839 0.07461 0.04054 0.18718 0.17368 0.18045 0.13261 
[0.00912] [0.21119] [0.33] [0.55549] [0.34142] [1.80466] [1.93797] [1.7826] [0.85506] 
x6 0.06048 0.07017 0.10456 0.04373 0.10339 -0.01935 0.01889 0.05291 0.11495 
[0.2726] [0.53099] [1.08022] [0.43486] [0.99567] [-0.19995] [0.20373] [0.53057] [0.74654] 
x7 0.07605 0.09431 0.01144 -0.00511 -0.07502 -0.02835 -0.01705 0.08331 0.01314 
[0.4473] [0.74244] [0.10327] [-0.04984] [-0.75898] [-0.31987] [-0.18632] [0.77735] [0.06383] 
x8 -0.01902 0.01458 0.14007 0.15875 0.19107 0.20169 0.2107 0.11715 0.00148 
[-0.10098] [0.09231] [1.09052] [1.41915] [1.90615] [2.24986] [2.68232] [1.19182] [0.00867] 
x9 0.04415 -0.05497 -0.13377 -0.10206 -0.06533 -0.09781 -0.12495 -0.02567 0.08067 
[0.17393] [-0.31635] [-1.08392] [-0.99524] [-0.74368] [-1.12933] [-1.25537] [-0.21038] [0.47842] 
x10 0.12294 0.13761 0.15909 0.13314 0.05848 0.11119 0.16063 0.16594 0.16543 
[0.65378] [1.20321] [1.78107] [1.6314] [0.73586] [1.2802] [1.72287] [1.48531] [1.05313] 
afqt 0.01073 0.00652 -0.00379 -0.00464 -0.00686 -0.00064 0.0012 0.00391 -0.00134 
[0.90773] [0.86531] [-0.61668] [-0.84263] [-1.22248] [-0.11269] [0.16163] [0.48098] [-0.14132] 
afqt2 -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00001 0.00001 0 0.00001 
[-0.79749] [-0.42821] [1.24047] [1.40729] [1.76606] [0.86549] [0.40515] [0.07418] [0.51465] 
 
 
124
Table 4.6: Continued 
Tau 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
parttime -0.25402 -0.21469 -0.32367 -0.19022 -0.16169 -0.19045 -0.1334 0.08655 0.40027 
[-0.3796] [-0.62508] [-1.64037] [-1.39053] [-1.44018] [-1.58765] [-0.95448] [0.58528] [2.05978] 
enrolled -1.27493 -1.34246 -0.63838 -0.34628 -0.35345 -0.35212 -0.35725 -0.27765 -0.39514 
[-0.0005] [-0.00041] [-0.00029] [-0.00023] [-0.97973] [-0.69498] [-0.5374] [-0.44219] [-0.97263] 
lesshs -0.00194 0.01327 -0.03742 0.00829 -0.01043 -0.00013 -0.03021 -0.0277 -0.10121 
[-0.01558] [0.15656] [-0.60133] [0.14328] [-0.20676] [-0.00247] [-0.51365] [-0.425] [-0.95702] 
somecoll -0.05049 0.03477 0.05509 0.11788 0.15304 0.10723 0.12293 0.08943 0.11537 
[-0.53687] [0.51342] [0.8669] [1.91849] [2.59767] [1.87671] [1.88235] [1.05448] [0.86162] 
collgrad 0.27728 0.2231 0.20475 0.23863 0.30581 0.24785 0.26602 0.33369 0.31928 
[1.82558] [2.1455] [1.92478] [2.47169] [3.47383] [2.96912] [3.39947] [3.77915] [2.496] 
gradsch 0.49405 0.49055 0.43169 0.44381 0.44489 0.36408 0.42181 0.4746 0.58005 
[1.81033] [3.04178] [3.64299] [4.18639] [5.26721] [4.68897] [4.16575] [3.51377] [2.92079] 
married 0.08661 0.04629 0.05649 0.05142 0.05466 0.06476 0.04972 0.04259 -0.03335 
[0.95241] [0.78891] [1.09623] [1.09872] [1.17345] [1.36184] [0.9718] [0.80354] [-0.39564] 
childpresent 0.09623 0.16509 0.126 0.13439 0.11731 0.07994 0.15643 0.12669 0.21663 
[1.09237] [2.49716] [2.2329] [2.7286] [2.47838] [1.71293] [2.8655] [2.23403] [2.55076] 
urban 0.43056 0.19711 0.15575 0.21031 0.23184 0.23228 0.19574 0.2356 0.19771 
[3.40812] [1.93075] [1.82184] [2.41528] [3.00746] [3.49035] [2.5598] [1.68136] [0.38713] 
northeast -0.02748 0.04686 0.07741 0.08294 0.14859 0.16279 0.14684 0.15209 0.09229 
[-0.24422] [0.67128] [1.2816] [1.45753] [2.37521] [2.54431] [2.04133] [1.71732] [0.84042] 
northcentral 0.01931 0.02328 0.02516 0.02011 0.07035 0.03073 0.08253 0.10072 0.15415 
[0.17626] [0.29354] [0.37851] [0.3087] [1.2701] [0.61363] [1.57616] [1.73331] [1.37705] 
west 0.05612 0.03094 0.10625 0.25941 0.25417 0.20546 0.23493 0.36467 0.31569 
[0.38418] [0.23724] [0.89944] [3.16182] [3.13408] [1.85577] [1.65815] [2.87528] [0.69033] 
unemp -0.10001 -0.09357 -0.0946 -0.08761 -0.10252 -0.06023 -0.02878 -0.05977 -0.07017 
[-1.39202] [-1.6223] [-2.0003] [-2.02096] [-2.56872] [-1.54208] [-0.62197] [-1.31042] [-1.30068] 
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conditional wage distribution. The covariate effects of experience accumulated 2 to 10 
years ago are often too imprecisely estimated across the conditional quantiles to make a 
definitive statement about how these covariate effects vary across the conditional 
distribution of wages. 
 
4.6 Decomposition results 
Previous studies have examined the distribution of the black - white gap (see 
O’Neill et al 2002; Melly 2006a). These studies examined and decomposed the black 
white wager gap at different points of the wage distribution. By examining the wage gap 
at different points of the wage distribution, we can explore different aspects of racial 
inequality including whether glass ceilings or sticky floors are present in the wage 
structure. A glass ceiling exists when the wage gap is larger at the top of the earnings 
distribution and a sticky floor exists when the wage gap is large at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution (see Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2005)). Melly (2006b), using 
a single year of data (2001) from the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups, illustrates 
that the black – white wage differential is larger at the top of the wage distribution than at 
the bottom of the wage distribution. Correcting for differences in the distribution of 
characteristics, (education, potential experience and region of residence) he shows that 
the wage gap increase across the wage distribution, but remains constant from the 30th 
percentile to the end of the distribution. Melly argues that this represents evidence against 
the presence of a glass ceiling (under a glass ceiling the wage gap should increase across 
the distribution not remain constant). 
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O’Neill et al (2003) use the semiparametric estimator of DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996) to derive the counterfactual distribution and decompose the black – 
white wage gap into explained and unexplained components. Using data for the year 
1993 from the 1979 National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), they demonstrate 
that the adjusted wage gap increases from less than 10 percent at the lowest percentile to 
roughly 26 percent at the 20th percentile and 35 percent at the 30th percentile. The wage 
gap then falls gradually back to 26 percent at the 70th percentile before dropping to less 
than 20 percent at the 90th percentile. These results mirror the findings of Melly and 
suggest that the wage gap increases the fastest at the lower parts of the distribution. 
However, O’Neil et al. show the gap decreasing slightly beyond the 30th percentile while 
Melly shows the gap increasing slightly beyond the 30th percentile. Both studies do not 
find strong evidence that blacks face a glass ceiling with respect to wages. 
In this section of the chapter, I examine and decompose the wage gap at various 
points of the distribution to shed more light on the nature of discrimination. The 
decomposition of the wage distribution was performed in Stata using a program 
developed by Melly.11 The first step of the decomposition involved estimating 100 
conditional quantile functions. Standard errors for the estimates are produced by 
bootstrapping the results 1000 times. Conditional quantiles are estimated using the actual 
experience specification and the more detailed work history specification. Figure 4.5 
displays plots of the wage decomposition by each quantile where each conditional 
quantile is estimated using the actual experience specification. The figure illustrates that 
the adjusted wage gap increases from the bottom to the top of the conditional wage 
distribution, but the rate at which the gap grows is faster at the bottom of the conditional 
                                                            
11 See Melly 2006b for a discussion of the estimator and its statistical properties. 
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distribution. Blacks earn 14 percent less than whites at the 10th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution, 21 percent less than whites at the 25th percentile and 25, 
27 and 29 percent less than whites respectively at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of 
the conditional wage distribution. Differences in the distribution of characteristics and 
differences in the returns to characteristics both contribute positively to the wage gap at 
every point of the conditional wage  
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition of Differences in Distributions: Actual Experience Model 
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distribution. At the 10th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, differences in the 
distribution of characteristics account for 53 percent of the wage gap while differences in 
the returns to characteristics account for 47 percent of the wage gap. At the 25th 
percentile, differences in characteristics and coefficients contribute equally to the wage 
gap. Beyond the 25th percentile, differences in the distribution of characteristics account 
for a relatively larger share of the wage gap. Differences in characteristics account for 54 
percent of the wage gap at the median and 60 percent of the wage gap at the 75th and 
90th percentiles of the conditional wage distribution.  
Figure 4.6 displays plots of the wage decomposition by each quantile where each 
conditional quantile is estimated using the work history specification. The total wage 
differential estimated from the work history specification is identical to the total 
differential estimated from the actual experience specification. Under the work history 
model however, differences in the distribution of characteristics account for 68 percent of 
the wage gap at the 10th percentile of the conditional wage distribution compared to 47 
percent under the actual experience specification. At the 25th and 50th percentiles, 
differences in the distribution of characteristics respectively account for 57 and 61 
percent of the wage gap under the work history specification compared to 50 and 46 
percent under the actual experience specification. At the 95th percentile of the 
conditional wage distribution, differences in the distribution of characteristics account for 
roughly 60 percent of the wage gap in both the actual experience and the work history 
specifications. In summary, the differences in the distribution of characteristics account 
for relatively more of the wage gap at lower parts of the conditional wage distribution 
under the work history specification than under the actual experience specification. This 
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suggests that the additional information provided by the work history specification which 
accounts for differences  
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Figure 4.6: Decomposition of Differences in Distributions: Work History Model 
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in the timing of experience accumulation and work interruptions explains more of the 
wage gap than the traditional cumulative measure of experience. Beyond the 50th 
percentile, the differences in the distribution of characteristics accounts for roughly 60 
percent of the wage gap under both the work history and actual experience specifications.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the returns to labor market experience at various points 
of the wage distribution and how these estimates vary depending on how experience is 
measured. Labor market experience is measured using cumulative actual experience and 
alternatively a detailed work history of the fraction of time worked in every year of the 
workers career. When experience is measured using cumulative years of actual 
experience the returns to experience for whites declines across the conditional wage 
distribution yet remains constant for blacks. In both cases however, these covariate 
effects are fairly imprecise. When experience is measured using a retrospective array of 
the amount worked in each year going back to the beginning of the worker’s career, the 
returns to experience accumulated one year ago remains more or less constant for both 
blacks and whites as one moves across the conditional wage distribution with whites 
having higher returns than blacks at every point of the conditional wage distribution. The 
returns to experience for time worked more than one year ago are much more imprecisely 
estimated. The second part of the chapter decomposes the differences in the black – white 
wage distributions into explained and unexplained parts. Wage decompositions of the 
work history and actual experience specifications are computed using a Machado - Mata 
type estimator developed by Melly (2006a). In both specifications, differences in the 
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distribution of characteristics and differences in the return to characteristics both 
contribute positively to the black - white gap, however differences in the distribution of 
characteristics explains a relatively larger share of the wage gap in the upper parts of the 
conditional wage distribution. When experience is measured using the individual’s 
retrospective work history, differences in the distribution of characteristics explains a 
relatively larger part of the wage gap at lower parts of the distribution.  
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined various aspects of the black-white wage gap. In 
the last twenty years, differences in wages between blacks and whites have remained 
relative constant.  This is in contrast to the previous twenty years when blacks made rapid 
improvements in their wages relative to whites. The convergence in wages between 
blacks and whites observed during the 1960s and 1970s has been attributed to the effects 
of anti-discrimination legislation and the fact that blacks were able to attend better quality 
schools because of desegregation and increased funding of predominantly black schools. 
The slow down and reversal in the convergence in black-white wages during the 1980s 
and 1990s has been attributed to persistent difference in the level and growth of human 
capital between blacks and whites.  However, the barriers blacks now face in acquiring 
human capital are less obvious since it appears that discrimination faced by blacks is less 
overt than in the past.  
The first chapter of this dissertation examined how differences in the returns to 
experience and the pattern of experience accumulation contributes to the gap in wages 
between blacks and whites. The results suggest that accounting for the heterogeneity in 
experience accumulation during workers’ careers cannot explain much of the wage gap 
and that large constant differences in wages remain between blacks and whites. One 
possible interpretation of this finding is that, the constant differences in wages captured 
by differences in the intercepts of the wage equation may represent differences in 
unobserved worker skill. This is consistent with work of Neal and Johnson (1996) and 
others which finds that there are unobserved skill differences between blacks and whites 
that can be captured by differences in scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
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(AFQT). Neal and Johnson argue that these differences are important determinants of the 
black-white wage gap. They hypothesize that these differences may be related to 
differences in family environments that may affect the human capital acquisition process 
before labor market entry.  
Others, like Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov (2005), argue that focusing on 
differences in skill as measured by differences in AFQT scores gives an incomplete 
measure of how the skill gaps evolve. They show that AFQT score differences cannot 
explain all the differences in wages especially when the AFQT scores are adjusted for by 
the amount of schooling the individual has received at the time of the test. They 
demonstrate that the skill gaps occur at a very early age; often before high school entry. 
This suggests that improvements in the formal schooling of blacks may do little to reduce 
black-white differences in wages. The fact that the gaps can occur as early as the age of 
5, suggest that black-white differences in family environment are important. Their work 
is part of a growing literature that focuses on differences in non-cognitive skills in 
explaining differences in labor market and social outcomes between blacks and whites. 
These differences in non-cognitive skills are believed to be a function of differences in 
family environments.  
Another explanation for the differences in intercepts between blacks and whites is 
that the lower intercepts of blacks may reflect their lower reservation wages. Blacks may 
have lower reservation wages if they receive lower wage offers because of discriminatory 
employers. Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) present a search model with 
discriminatory employers in which employers search and make offers to predominately 
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white networks. This lowers the reservation wage of blacks because when they encounter 
discriminatory employers they have reduced bargaining power.  
The second chapter of the dissertation takes a first step in examining the role of 
discrimination in explaining black-white wage differences by testing for statistical 
discrimination by employers. In this second chapter I ask whether statistical 
discrimination by employers causes the wages of never incarcerated blacks to suffer 
when the incarceration rate of lacks increases. Under statistical discrimination, employers 
form perceptions about a worker’s productivity based on observable characteristics like 
age, race, gender, and education. One relevant productivity attribute is the probability that 
a worker has a criminal background. Since employers may be are reluctant to hire 
individuals with a criminal background, they may use formal screens like criminal 
background checks or informal screens like statistical discrimination. Raphael (2004) 
presents some evidence of statistical discrimination by showing that increases in the 
fraction of incarcerated blacks can explain up to half of the decline in black male 
employment relative to whites.  
My results do not offer evidence in support of statistical discrimination by 
employers. I find that a one unit increase in the black county incarceration rate reduces 
wages by 13% for all black males and by roughly 15% for black males with either a high 
school degree or some college education. However, the results are not robust to the 
inclusion of year effects which causes the coefficient on the black county incarceration 
rate to decline in half and lose statistical significance. The direction of the effect, 
however, remains negative. This suggests that there are important local area 
macroeconomic effects on wages which are correlated with the incarceration rate of 
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blacks in an area. While I do not find evidence in support of statistical discrimination, it 
may be the case that what is relevant is what Becker calls taste-based discrimination. 
Taste-based discrimination occurs when employers or individuals have general prejudice 
towards members of a certain group.  
In the third chapter, I extend the analyses of the black-white wage gap beyond the 
mean to see if the wage gap, and the factors that are driving the wage gap, vary across the 
distribution. I examine the distribution of wages using two alternative wage models. The 
first is the standard wage model that measures experience as cumulative years of 
experience and the second is the more detailed work history model that accounts for the 
timing of experience. I find that at the top of the conditional wage distribution, 
differences in the distribution of characteristics explain relatively more of the black-white 
wage gap than differences in the prices of characteristics. This is the case in both the 
actual experience and work history models. At the bottom of the conditional wage 
distribution, differences in the distribution of characteristics explain relatively more of 
the wage gap in the work history model only. This suggests that differences in the timing 
of experience and work interruptions that are captured in the work history model are 
important in explaining the black-white wage gap at lower parts of the distribution.  
I also find that the overall wage gap increases from the bottom to the top of the 
conditional wage distribution. However, the rate at which the gap grows is faster at the 
bottom of the conditional distribution. At the upper parts of the distribution wage gaps 
are more or less constant. This suggests that blacks neither face a glass ceiling or a sticky 
floor with respect to wages.  
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My research illustrates that much remains unknown about the persistent 
differences in wages between blacks and whites. I find differences in the patterns of labor 
market experience between blacks and whites. However, accounting for these differences 
does not explain much of the wage gap. I also find that statistical discrimination does not 
explain the variation in black wages in specific labor markets. Future work should focus 
on the human capital process before labor market entry. Particularly, how differences 
family background affect the acquisition of human capital before labor market entry.    
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Appendix: Description of Variables Used in Analysis 
  
actual_exp Years of cumulative labor market experience 
  
actual_exp2 Squared of cumulative labor market experience 
  
x1 Fraction of time worked one year ago 
  
x2 Fraction of time worked two years ago 
  
…  
  
x10 Fraction of time worked ten years ago 
  
afqt Standardized Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) Score 
  
afqt2 Square of standardized AFQT scores  
  
parttime Working part time  
  
enrolled Currently enrolled in school 
  
lesshs Has less than education 
  
hs High school graduate 
  
somecoll Has some college education 
  
collgrad College graduate  
  
gradsch At least a graduate degree  
  
married Married 
  
childpresent Children present  
  
urban Urban residence  
  
northeast Resides in the north eastern United States 
  
northcentral Resides in the north central United States 
  
west Resides in the western United States 
  
unemp Local unemployment rate 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
140 
 
References 
Abraham, Katharine G., and Henry S. Farber. 1987. The American Economic Review 
77(3) (June): 278-297. 
 
Albrecht, James, Aico van Vuuren, and Susan Vroman. 2007. Counterfactual 
Distributions with Sample Selection Adjustments: Econometric Theory and an 
Application to the Netherlands. Working Paper (July) 
 
Albrecht, James, Anders Bjorklund, and Susan Vroman. 2003. Journal of Labor 
Economics 21(1): 145-177. 
 
Altonji, Joseph G., and Rebecca M. Blank. 1999. Race and Gender in The Labor Market. 
In Handbook of Labor Economics. edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Elsevier 
Science  
 
Altonji, Joseph G., and Robert A. Shakotko. 1987. Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority? 
The Review of Economic Studies 54(3) (July): 437-459. 
 
Angrist, Joshua, Victor Chernozhukov, and Iván Fernández-Val. 2006. Quantile 
Regression Under Misspecification, With an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure. 
Econometrica 74(2) (March): 539-563. 
 
Antecol, Heather, and Kelly Bedard. 2004. The Racial Wage Gap: The Importance of 
Labor Force Attachment Differences across Black, Mexican, and White Men. Journal of 
Human Resources 39(2) (Spring): 564-583. 
 
Arulampalam, Wiji, Alison L. Booth, and Mark L. Bryan. 2007. Is There a Glass Ceiling 
over Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wage Distribution. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 60(2) (January): 163-186. 
 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2005. Rising Wage 
Inequality: The Role of Composition and Prices NBER Working Paper 11628. 
 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2007. Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists NBER Working Paper 11627. 
 
Bjerk, David.  2007. The Differing Nature of Black-White Wage Inequality Across 
Occupational Sectors. Journal of Human Resources 42(2): 398-434.  
 
Bollinger, Christopher R. 2003. Measurement Error in Human Capital and The Black-
White Wage Gap. The Review of Economics and Statistics 85(3) (August): 578–585. 
 
Borjas, George J., Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2006. Immigration and 
African-American Employment Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment, 
and Incarceration To Labor Supply Shocks. NBER Working Paper 12518 
 
141 
 
 
Bratsberg, Bernt, and Dek Terrell. 1998. Experience, Tenure, and Wage Growth of 
Young Black and White Men. Journal of Human Resources 33(3) (Summer): 658-682. 
 
Brown, James N., and Audrey Light. 1992. Interpreting Panel Data on Job Tenure. 
Journal of Labor Economics 10(3) (July): 219-257. 
 
Buchinsky, Moshe. 1994. Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of 
Quantile Regression. Econometrica 62(2) (March): 405-458. 
 
Buchinsky, Moshe. 1995. Quantile Regression, Box-Cox Transformation Model, and the 
U.S. Wage Structure, 1963-1987. Journal of Econometrics 65: 109- I54. 
 
Bushway, Shawn D. 1996. The Impact of a Criminal History Record on Access to 
Legitimate Employment. Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh 
 
Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1992. School Quality and Black-White Relative 
Earnings: A Direct Assessment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1) (February): 
151-200. 
 
Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1996. School Resources and Student Outcomes: An 
Overview of The Literature and New Evidence From North and South Carolina. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 10(4): 31–50. 
 
Carneiro, Pedro, James J. Heckman, Dimitriy V. Masterov. 2005. Labor Market 
Discrimination and Racial Differences in Premarket Factors. Journal of Law and 
Economics 48: 1–39. 
 
Chamberlain, Gary. 1994. Quantile Regression, Censoring, and the Structure of Wages. 
In Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress edited by Christopher A. Sims. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chandra, Amitabh. (2003). Is the Convergence of the Racial Wage Gap Illusory? NBER 
Working Paper 9476. 
 
Chay, Kenneth Y., and David S. Lee. 2000. Changes in Relative Wages in The 1980s: 
Returns to Observed and Unobserved Skills and Black - White Wage Differentials. 
Journal of Econometrics 99: 1-38. 
 
D’Amico, Ronald, and Nan L. Maxwell. 1994. The Impact of Post-School Joblessness on 
Male Black-White Wage Differentials. Industrial Relations 33(2) (April): 184 - 205. 
 
de la Rica, Sara, Juan J. Dolado, and Vanesa Llorens. 2008. Ceilings or floors? Gender 
wage gaps by education in Spain. Journal of Population Economics 21: 751-776  
 
 
142 
 
Dickens, William T., Lawrence F. Katz, Kevin Lang, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1989. 
Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics 7(3) (July): 
331–47. 
 
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. Labor Market Institutions 
and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach. Econometrica 
64(5) (September): 1001-1044. 
 
Donohue, John J., and James Heckman. 1991. Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The 
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks. Journal of Economic 
Literature 29(4) (December): 1603-1643. 
 
Filer, Randall K. 1993. The Usefulness of Predicted Values for Prior Work Experience in 
Analyzing Labor Market Outcomes for Women. Journal of Human Resources 28(3) 
(Summer): 519-537. 
 
Finlay, Keith. 2008. Effect of Employer Access to Criminal History Data on the Labor 
Market Outcomes of Ex-Offenders and Non-Offenders. NBER Working Paper 13935. 
 
Freeman, Richard B. 1981. Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and 
Why? In Studies in Labor Markets. edited by S. Rosen. University of Chicago Press: 247-
294. 
 
Garvey, Nancy, and Cordelia W. Reimers. 1979. Predicted vs. Potential Work Experience 
in an Earnings Function for Young Women. Working Papers Princeton University, 
Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. 
 
Gosling, Amanda, Stephen Machin, and Costas Meghir. 2000. The Changing Distribution 
of Male Wages in the U.K. The Review of Economic Studies 67(4) (October): 635-666. 
 
Grogger, Jeff. 1992. Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and Black - White 
Employment Differentials. The Review of Economics and Statistics 74(1) (February): 
100-106. 
 
Grogger, Jeff. 1996. Does School Quality Explain the Recent Black/White Wage Trend? 
Journal of Labor Economics 14(2) (April): 231-253. 
 
Grogger, Jeffrey. 1995. The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of Young 
Men. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1) (February): 51-71. 
 
Heckman, James J., and Brook S. Payner. 1989. Determining the Impact of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina. 
The American Economic Review 79(1) (March): 138-177. 
 
Heckman, James J., Lance J. Lochner, and Petra E. Todd. 2003. Fifty Years of Mincer 
Earnings Regressions. NBER Working Paper 9732 
 
143 
 
 
Hidalgo, Manuel A. 2008. Wage Inequality in Spain, 1980-2000. Working Paper. 
University Pablo de Olavide 
 
Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. 2003. Employer Demand for Ex-
Offenders: Recent Evidence from Los Angeles. Institute for Research on Poverty 
Discussion Paper no. 1268-03. 
 
Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. 2006. Employers in the Boom: 
How Did the Hiring of Less-Skilled Workers Change During the 1990’s. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 88(1) (February): 283–299. 
 
Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Steven Raphael. 2006. Perceived Criminality, 
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers. Journal of 
Law and Economics 49(2): 451-480. 
 
Irwin, John and James Austin. 1994. It’s About Time: America's Imprisonment Binge. 
Belmont, CA. Wadsworth. 
 
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy, and Brooks Pierce. 1991. Accounting for the 
slowdown in black-white wage convergence. In Workers and Their Wages. edited by 
Marvin H. Kosters AEI Press: Washington DC. 
 
Kling, Jeffrey R. 2006. Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings. The American 
Economic Review 96(3) (June): 863-876. 
 
Koenker, Roger and Gilbert Bassett Jr. 1978. Regression Quantiles. Econometrica 46(1) 
(January): 33-50. 
 
Koenker, Roger and Kevin F. Hallock. 2001. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) 
(Fall): 143–156. 
 
Koenker, Roger. 2004. Quantile Regression for Longitudinal Data. Journal of 
Multivariate Analysis 91:74 – 89 
 
Kunze, Astrid. 2002. The Timing of Careers and Human Capital Depreciation. IZA DP 
No. 509 
 
Lazear, Edward. 1979. The Narrowing of Black-White Wage Differentials is Illusory. 
The American Economic Review 69(4) (September): 553-564. 
 
Lemieux, Thomas. 2002. Decomposing Wage Distributions: a Unified Approach. 
Canadian Journal of Economics 35(4) (November): 646-88. 
 
Light, Audrey, and Manuelita Ureta. 1995. Early-Career Work Experience and Gender 
Wage Differentials. Journal of Labor Economics 13(1) (January): 121-154. 
 
144 
 
 
Lott, John R. 1990. The Effect of Conviction on the Legitimate Income of Criminals. 
Economics Letters 34(4): 381-385. 
 
Machado, Jose A.F., and Jose Mata. 2005. Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in 
Wage Distributions Using Quantile Regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(4): 
445-465. 
 
Machado, Jose A.F., and Jose Mata. 2005. Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in 
Wage Distributions Using Quantile Regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(4): 
445-465. 
 
Malkiel, Burton G., and Judith A. Malkiel. 1973. Male-Female Pay Differentials in 
Professional Employment. The American Economic Review 63(4) (September): 693-705. 
 
Melly, Blaise. 2005. Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials in Germany: Evidence 
from Quantile Regression. Empirical Economics 30: 505–520. 
 
Melly, Blaise. 2006. Applied Quantile Regression. University of St. Gallen Dissertation. 
 
Melly, Blaise. 2006. Decomposition of Differences in Distribution Using Quantile 
Regression. University of St. Gallen Dissertation (Chapter 2). 
 
Melly, Blaise. 2006a. Estimation of Counterfactual Distributions Using Quantile 
Regression. University of St. Gallen Working Paper. 
 
Mincer, Jacob, and Boyan Jovanovic. 1982. Labor Mobility and Wages. NBER Working 
Paper No. 357 
 
Moulton, Brent R. 1986. An Analysis of Female Work Experience Data Derived from 
Social Security Records. Joumal of Economic and Social Measurement 14: 65-75. 
 
Neal, Derek A., and William R. Johnson. 1996. The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-
White Wage Differences. Journal of Political Economy 104(5) (October): 869-895. 
 
Neal, Derek. 2006. Why Has Black–White Skill Convergence Stopped. In The Handbook 
of Economics of Education. edited by E. Hanushek and F. Welch. 1: 511-576 
 
Neal, Derek. 2008. Black–White Labor Market Inequality in the United States. 
Forthcoming in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
 
O’Neill, Donal, Olive Sweetman, and Dirk Van de gaer. 2000. Estimating Counterfactual 
Densities: An Application to Black-White Wage Differentials in the US. Working Paper. 
 
O'Neill, June. 1990. The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences Between Black 
and White Men. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4(4) (Autumn): 25-45. 
 
145 
 
 
Pager, Devah. 2003. The Mark of a Criminal Record. American Journal of Sociology. 
108(5): 937-975. 
 
Plotnick, Robert. (2004). Comment On: The Socioeconomic Status of Black Males: The 
Increasing Importance of Incarceration: by Steven Raphael. 
 
Raphael Steven. (2004). The Socioeconomic Status of Black Males: The Increasing 
Importance of Incarceration. forthcoming In Poverty, the Distribution of Income 
 
Regan, Tracy and Ronald L. Oaxaca. .2006. Work Experience as a Source of 
Specification Error in Earnings Models: Implications for Gender Wage Decompositions. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 1920 
 
Smith, James P., and Finis R. Welch. 1986. Closing the Gap: Forty Years of Economic 
Progress for Blacks. Rand Mimeograph R 3330 
 
Smith, James P., and Finis R. Welch. 1989. Black Economic Progress After Myrdal. 
Journal of Economic Literature 27(2) (June): 519-564. 
 
Spivey, Christy. 2005. Time Off at What Price? The Effects of Career Interruptions on 
Earnings. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 59(1) (October): 119-140. 
 
Welch, Finis. 2003. Catching up: Wages of Black Men. The American Economic Review 
93(2): 320-325 
 
Western, Bruce, and Becky Pettit. 2000. Incarceration and Racial Inequality in Men's 
Employment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54(1) (October): 3-16. 
 
Western, Bruce. 2002. The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality. 
American Sociological Review 67(4) (August): 526-546. 
 
Wolpin, Kenneth I. 1992. The Determinants of Black-White Differences in Early 
Employment Careers: Search, Layoffs, Quits, and Endogenous Wage Growth. Journal of 
Political Economy 100(3) (June): 535-560. 
 
 
  
 
146 
 
VITA 
NOLA OGUNRO          
Date and Place of Birth 
 
April 7th, 1977, Rhinebeck, NY 
 
Education 
 
M.S. Economics, University of Kentucky, 2003 
B.A. Economics and Mathematics, University of Texas at Austin, 2000 
 
Professional Experience  
 
Research Assistant  
Center for Business and Economic Research, University of Kentucky, Spring 2008 – 
Spring 2009 
College of Nursing, University of Kentucky, Fall 2003 – Spring 2006 
 
Teaching Assistant  
University of Kentucky, Fall 2004 – Spring 2005  
 
Publications  
 
“Smoke-Free Laws and Employee Turnover” with Eric Thompson, Ellen J. Hahn, Glenn 
Blomquist, John Garen, Don Mullineaux and Mary K. Rayens. Contemporary Economic 
Policy 26 (July 2008): 351-359. 
 
Honors and Awards 
Lyman T. Johnson Fellowship, University of Kentucky, 2002-2004  
 
Professional Affiliations 
Southern Economic Association (SEA) 
 
